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THE ROLE OF GENDER AND
RELATIONSHIP IN REFORMING THE
ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS
EDA KATHARINE TINTO*
In recent years, New York's drug sentencing laws-the Rockefeller Drug Laws-
have come under attack due to their failure to reduce drug use despite the growing
prison population. The political and academic communities now are debating how
best to reform these laws. In this Note, Eda Tinto highlights the absence of a much-
needed discussion regarding the sentencing of certain women drug offenders.
Qualitative studies have demonstrated that an underlying context of many women's
drug crimes is their involvement in an intimate relationship with a partner who uses
or sells drugs. Tinto argues that these women drug offenders are often less blame-
worthy than other offenders and that therefore the sentences for their crimes are
often unjust. Tinto concludes that the context of an intimate relationship should be
acknowledged in sentencing and proposes reforms of the Rockefeller Drug Laws.
INTRODUCTION
In 1973, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller successfully
urged the passage of the most punitive drug laws in the country.1 The
"Rockefeller Drug Laws" (the Laws) removed the discretion tradi-
tionally afforded to judges in sentencing individual offenders and
forced judges to sentence drug offenders to extremely long prison
terms.2 While the enactment of the Laws signaled the beginning of
* I would like to thank Professor Anthony Thompson, my family, and my friends for
their continual guidance and support for this Note and, more importantly, in life. I also
would like to thank the staff of the New York University Law Review, especially Dave
McTaggart, Maggie Lemos, Janet Carter, and Michael Kasdan.
1 Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 57 (1999); Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It Time to
Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 613, 613 (1999)
(stating that Governor Rockefeller and Legislature enacted toughest drug laws in country
in response to increased drug use); see also Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin,
The Evolution and Present Status of New York Drug Control Legislation, 22 Buff. L. Rev.
705, 733 (1973) (stating that Rockefeller Drug Laws (the Laws) evidence "strict law en-
forcement attitude" regarding drug crime in New York).
2 See Joint Comm. on N.Y. Drug Law Evaluation, The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., The Nation's Toughest Drug Law: Evaluating the New York Experience 3 (1977)
[hereinafter Joint Comm.] (stating that Laws raised penalties for sale and possession of-
fenses); see also Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Rockefeller Drug Law Repeal 1 (Feb. 2001) (on file
with the New York University Law Review) (stating that Laws enacted long prison terms
for many drug offenses); Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 732 (stating that Laws
require mandatory minimum prison sentences without opportunity for probation for many
drug offenders).
Most of these laws were passed as part of the New York Substance Control Act revi-
sions in 1973. See Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 618 (citing 1972 N.Y. Laws 878). Among the
906
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the widely supported national "war on drugs," people on all sides of
the debate now agree that the Laws have failed to achieve their stated
goals and are in need of reform.3 The most-cited reason for reform is
that the Laws have contributed to the enormous increase in the cost of
prison operation, yet have failed to reduce significantly the amount of
drug use in New York.4 Another critical reason why many advocate
for the reform of the Laws is that the "war on drugs," in the words of
one scholar, "has become a war on women."5 The number of women
provisions was the establishment of mandatory enhanced sentences for all drug offenders.
For more on the history and components of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, see infra Part LA;
see also Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 618.
3 A multitude of groups, including former supporters of the Laws, now speak out
against them. E.g., John R_ Dunne, Editorial, Paying for Failed Drug Laws, Wash. Post,
August 12, 1999, at A27 (claiming laws have "failed to achieve their goals" in editorial by
former State Senator Dunne, an original sponsor of Laws); Editorial, The General is Right,
Tunes Union (Albany, N.Y.), July 4, 1999, at B4 (reporting that all "major figures" in
debate, including Governor Pataki, recognize need for reform); David I. Goldstein, Edito-
rial, Drug Laws Handcuff Our Judges, Herald Am. (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 11, 1999, at D3,
available at 1999 WL 4692318 (calling for reform in editorial by director of New York State
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Lara Jakes, Catholic Church Leaders Urge
Drug Law Reforms, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), June 15, 1999, at B2 (discussing
proreform position of Catholic Church of New York); Joseph D. McNamara, Letter to the
Editor, Harsh Drug Laws' Boomerang Effect, Wall St. J., June 10, 1999, at A27 (discussing
failure of Laws in letter by former deputy inspector of New York Police Department); Paul
Shechtman, A Good Deal for Criminal Justice, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 1997, at 2 (calling Laws
"draconian" in opinion piece by former Director of Criminal Justice under Governor
Pataki). But see Steve Dnistrian, Letter to the Editor, Harsh Drug Laws' Boomerang Ef-
fect, Wall St. J., June 10, 1999, at A27 (editorial by Executive Vice President of Partnership
for a Drug-Free America voicing support of tough drug laws like Rockefeller Drug Laws);
Lara Jakes & John Caher, Draconian Drug Laws No Panacea, Times Union (Albany,
N.Y.), May 9, 1999, at Al (quoting chief assistant district attorney of Queens County, John
M. Ryan, stating view that Laws are effective).
4 A 1998 MacArthur Foundation and Robert Wood Foundation study on the effective-
ness of strict sentencing statutes like the Rockefeller Drug Laws found that they have very
little effect on illegal drug use. Jakes & Caher, supra note 3, at Al (citing study and others
regarding effectiveness of treatment over prison); see also Elliot Currie, Crime and Punish-
ment in America 77 (1998) (citing studies as support for claim that "putting ordinary drug
offenders behind bars has very little effect on rates of drug-related crime"); Joint Comm.,
supra note 2, at 7 (reporting 1976 findings that Laws did not decrease drug use; if anything,
drug use increased). The cost of total prison expenditures in New York is close to three
billion dollars per year;, fifteen years ago, the State spent only $840,000 per year. David C.
Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 Fordham Urb. LJ. 641, 644 (1993) (cit-
ing statistics from Correctional Association of New York).
5 Meda Chesney-Lind, The Female Offender 147 (1997) (explaining that war on drugs
has contributed to large increase in number of women incarcerated nationwide). There are
currently 950,000 women in criminal justice custody (in prison, jail, on parole or probation)
in the United States. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Women in Prison Fact Sheet (Mar. 2000), availa-
ble at http://w.corrassoc.orglwomen-fact.html. In 1991, one in three women in U.S.
prisons was incarcerated for a drug offense, compared to one in ten women in 1979.
Chesney-Lind, supra, at 147.
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in prison in New York State for drug offenses has skyrocketed as a
direct result of the Laws.
6
Since judges no longer have discretion to tailor sentences to the
context of the crime, women offenders, some of whom previously may
have received lighter sentences due to particular mitigating aspects of
their crimes,7 now face harsh mandatory sentences. While all defen-
dants, both male and female, face this inflexibility when charged with
a drug crime in New York, it is important to highlight that ignoring the
individual context of the crime seems particularly harsh for one sub-
group of women defendants. Qualitative studies demonstrate that the
underlying reason for many women defendants' drug offenses is their
involvement in an intimate relationship in which their partner uses or
sells drugs.8 As a result, the circumstances of a woman's drug crime
are often intertwined, not only with her partner's drug activities, but
also with the daily aspects of her intimate relationship.
Current debates over reform are devoid of any in-depth discus-
sion of how the Laws affect women whose drug crimes took place
within the context of an intimate relationship and whether their
sentences, which are given without consideration of this context, are
justified.9 Such discussion is a much-needed component of the
broader debate about reform of the Laws.' 0
6 See infra Part I.B for statistics.
7 Previous leniency may have been due to characteristics of the particular crimes (e.g.,
role in the offense), characteristics of the offenders (e.g., family responsibilities), or may
have been due to a paternalistic or chivalrous attitude on the part of judges. See infra note
19.
8 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
9 See Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 146 (stating that there has been "virtually no
public discussion" despite large increases in number of women in prison). Most articles
discussing the Rockefeller Drug Laws do not mention the impact on women at all or men-
tion the effect on women only in the "facts" section but not in the "proposal of reform"
section. See, e.g., Leven, supra note 4, at 654-57 (discussing prison growth nationwide and
proposing reforms that do not mention women offenders); Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 613
(discussing Laws and suggestions for their reform without using word "woman").
10 A discussion on how best to reform the Laws is currently ongoing in both the aca-
demic and political communities. See, e.g., Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Basic Principles of Drug
Law Reform (Feb. 2000) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (discussing
current legislative proposals and suggesting reforms); John Caher, Chief Judge Announces
Reforms, Judiciary to Move Ahead on Reorganizing Courts, Drug Laws, 18-B Rates, N.Y.
L., Jan. 9, 2001, at 1 (discussing Chief Judge Judith Kaye's proposals for judicial reform);
Tracy Huling, Women Drug Couriers: Sentencing Reform Needed for Prisoners of War,
Crim. Just., Winter 1995, at 14, 62 (discussing Rockefeller Drug Law reform as it relates to
women drug couriers); Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 631-34 (proposing reforms of the Laws);
Legal Aid Society, Reform the Rockefeller Drug Laws: Mandatory Sentencing and Drug
Offenders in New York State, at http://www.legal-aid.org/rock.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2001) (proposing alternatives to current Laws).
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This is not to suggest that some current proposals would not alle-
viate the harsh effects of the current Laws; some reforms could have a
positive impact on these women offenders as well as benefit others
who may be unfairly punished under the Laws.1 However, current
discussions of policy reform lack any explicit discussion of the context
of some women's drug crimes-namely, that of an intimate relation-
ship-and fail to acknowledge that recognition of this particular con-
text might help shape more just drug policies and sentences.
This Note contributes to the general discussion of why reform of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws is needed-and how to proceed with such
reform-by focusing on one group of offenders: women in relation-
ship.12 This Note describes how a woman's intimate relationship is
often interconnected with the drug offense she commits and demon-
strates how, under the Laws, the failure to consider this underlying
context results in a criminal charge and sentence that are likely to be
unjust.' 3
Part I reviews the original purposes and motivations of the Laws
and presents statistical data on the Laws' effect on women. Part II
examines how the existence of an intimate relationship may underlie
the criminal acts for which many women are charged under the Laws.
This Part also examines how women, specifically those in relation-
ships, fare in obtaining reductions of their sentences under the Laws'
provision for material assistance.' 4 Part Il argues that an understand-
ing of the context of women's drug crimes and their intimate relation-
ships must shape drug policy reform. This Note concludes by offering
specific reforms that strive to acknowledge more effectively-and
more justly-the complexities of many women's drug crimes.
I
THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS AND THEIR EFFECTS
A. The History of the Rockefeller Drug Laws
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a "get tough on crime"
movement was growing throughout the country.ls In reaction to the
11 For example, proposals that benefit low-level offenders, such as not determining the
crime charged solely by the amount of the drug, would often benefit women offenders as
well. See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of some current re-
form proposals.
12 See infra notes 48-49 (defining "women in relationship").
13 See infra notes 43-44 (discussing criteria of blameworthiness).
14 See infra note 115 (defining material assistance).
15 Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in The Oxford History of
the Prison 227, 243 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (discussing political
pressures for increased severity in sentencing during 1960s and 1970s). This same move-
ment continues to influence criminal justice policy today. See Christopher M. Alexander,
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publicized increases in drug use nationwide, this movement argued for
harsher penalties for drug crimes and less emphasis on rehabilitation
and drug treatment. 16 The push for strict mandatory minimum
sentences, although initiated by more conservative politicians, found
support among liberal organizations and politicians.17 Liberal advo-
cates of sentencing reform believed that removing judges' discretion
would help reduce race- and gender-based disparities in the length of
prison terms.18 In particular, some feminists advocated for the re-
moval of discretion in order to fight judicial paternalism and chivalry,
factors often cited as explaining gender-based sentencing disparities. 19
While mandatory sentencing schemes eliminated the shorter
sentences women previously had received through the exercise of ju-
Crushing Equality: Gender Equal Sentencing in America, 6 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 199,
200-06 (1997) (discussing past decade's "tough" sentencing policies and motivating
rationales).
16 See Joint Comm., supra note 2, at 3 (stating that one principal objective of Laws was
to deter drug offenders by threat of "get-tough" laws); Elliott Currie, Crime and Punish-
ment in the United States: Myths, Realities, and Possibilities, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 381, 381-82 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (noting trends toward
prison labor and three-strikes-and-you're-out laws); see also Paula C. Johnson, At the In-
tersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in Crime and Sentenc-
ing, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 1, 40 (1995) (stating that New York's 1960s approach to drug
treatment for low-level users was deemed "failure" by early 1970s); Tsimbinos, supra note
1, at 613, 622 (discussing public outcry against "scourge" of drug abuse and New York
Court of Appeals's recognition of Legislature's emphasis on isolation and deterrence
rather than rehabilitation); Families Against Mandatory Minimums, History of Mandatory
Minimums, at http://www.famm.org/about3.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2001) (noting unprec-
edented media attention to drugs, notably crack cocaine, in early 1980s).
17 See Alexander, supra note 15, at 205 (discussing both liberal and conservative sup-
port for mandatory minimum sentences); Mauer, supra note 1, at 47-49 (same).
18 Alexander, supra note 15, at 205 (stating that reforms were initiated to fight recog-
nized gender, race, and class discrimination in sentencing). The concern about disparities
based on race was grounded in the belief that defendants of color were treated more
harshly than white offenders. The concern about gender-based disparities was rooted in
the belief that women received more lenient penalties because of their gender. See infra
notes 19-20. These concerns about racial and gender disparities in sentencing motivated
sentencing reforms throughout the country in the 1970s and supported mandatory sentenc-
ing schemes at both the state and federal levels. See Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear
of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 31 (1998) (discussing critique of
"illegitimate considerations" influencing judicial discretion as motivation for sentencing
reform); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 6-9 (1996) (discussing nationwide sentencing
reform as motivated in part by evidence of racial and gender sentencing disparities).
19 Mary Coombs, Putting Women First, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1686, 1688-89 (1995) (review-
ing Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime, and Punishment (1994)) (describing studies that cited
unwanted chivalry as explanation for why women receive more lenient sentences than sim-
ilarly situated men); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 905, 917 (1993) (highlighting focus of sentencing re-
form on chivalry and paternalism as reasons for gender-based disparity); cf. Chesney-Lind,
supra note 5, at 150-51 (stating that chivalry often worked in favor of white women only).
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dicial discretion, these feminists supported such schemes because they
exemplified "equal treatment" of all people convicted of crimes.20 In
New York, politicians and community organizations, both liberal and
conservative, came together to fight for sentencing reform. As a re-
sult of this bipartisan support, the state legislature passed the core of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973.21
New York thus became the first state to enact mandatory mini-
mum sentences for drug crimes.2 The Laws mandated imprisonment
for several categories of drug offenses and increased both the number
of such categories and the length of corresponding sentences.2 For
example, an A-1 felony required the mandatory sentence of fifteen to
twenty-five years (minimum) to life (maximum), in addition to
mandatory parole for the rest of the offender's life.24 The sentence
equaled the possible sanction for murder in the first degree.25 Under
the 1973 law, an A-1 felony was defined as the possession of two
ounces of an illegal narcotic or the sale of one ounce of an illegal
narcotic.26 In contrast, prior to 1973, a class A felony required the
possession of at least sixteen ounces of a narcotic drug.2 7 Equally im-
portant, the mandatory sentencing scheme also removed all discretion
from the judge to consider mitigating factors, such as the defendant's
role in the offense, in determining an appropriate sentence.2
20 Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some
Feminist Questions About Justice, 17 Int'l J. Soc. L 1, 9 (1989) (stating that sentencing
reform affirmed value of equal treatment under law).
21 The Laws were enacted into the 1973 Laws of New York State as Chapters 276,277,
278, 676, and 1051. S. 6204, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 276); S. 6205, 1973-1974
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 277); H.R 7328, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 676);
H.R. 7873, 1973-1974 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1973) (Ch. 278); see also Joint Comm., supra note 2,
at 3 n.1, app. at 149 tbl.A-1, app. at 150 tbl.A-2 (describing crime levels and penalties for
drug offenses under New York Penal Law as of June 1977).
22 Families Against Mandatory Minimums, supra note 16. By 1983, forty other states
had passed mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. Id.
23 Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 615-16.
24 Joint Comm., supra note 2, app. at 150 tbl.A-2, 151, app. at 152-54 tbl.A-4.
25 Id. app. at 149 tbl.A-1, app. at 150 tbl.A-2; see also Shechtman, supra note 3. at 2
(highlighting drug sanction under Laws as potentially being same sanction as for murder
and almost twice that for rape).
26 Joint Comm., supra note 2, app. at 152-54 tbl.A4.
27 Quinn & McLaughlin, supra note 1, app. at 735. The sentence was the same for an
A-1 felony, however, in addition to requiring a greater amount of drugs, prior to 1973 only
certain drugs would merit an A-1 felony charge. See id. Prior to 1973, the sale of one
ounce of an illegal substance was considered a class C felony. Joint Comm., supra note 2,
app. at 151 tbl.A-3.
28 While the judge could still determine the appropriate sentence within the given
range, e.g., between fifteen and twenty-five years, a judge had no discretion to go below
the mandatory minimum sentence. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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The Laws have remained largely unchanged since 1973,29 and
have had a significant impact both in New York and across the nation.
They stand as a guiding example for other mandatory drug sentencing
schemes currently in place in other states. 30 They also served as a
model for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a mandatory-sentencing
scheme that is widely recognized as similarly tough and inflexible.31
29 For example, for an A-1 felony, the maximum penalty is still life imprisonment and
the minimum is still fifteen years for a first-time offender. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (Mc-
Kinney 1998 & Supp. 2001). Some key provisions of the current versions of the Laws
include N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001) (providing maximum and
minimum sentences for felony classes A to E); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.05 (McKinney 1998)
(providing for authorized disposition of sentences); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00 (McKinney
1998) (providing for sentences of probation); N.Y. Penal Law § 220 (McKinney 1998 &
Supp. 2001) (providing general regulations regarding controlled substances and various
levels of criminal sale and possession offenses); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 410.91 (McKinney
Supp. 2001) (providing for parole supervision).
In 1977, the Marijuana Reform Act created separate laws that dealt exclusively with
marijuana offenses. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 624 (citing Marijuana Reform Act, N.Y.
Penal Law § 221 (McKinney 1998)). In 1979, the Legislature passed a series of amend-
ments which, in part, increased some of the minimum amounts needed for certain drug
felonies. For example, the amount needed for an A-1 felony for an unlawful sale was
increased from one ounce to two ounces. Id. at 625. In 1992, new legislation permitted the
option of treatment in certain circumstances for a first-time felon convicted of a class C, D,
or E drug felony. Leven, supra note 4, at 648. In 1995, the Legislature overruled a previ-
ous New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Ryan, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993), and
removed the prosecutors' burden of proving knowledge of the weight of the drug involved
in the offense. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 626. In the same year, the Legislature passed
the New York Sentencing Reform Act, which changed some of the sentencing require-
ments for both predicate felons and first-time offenders. For a description of the 1995 New
York Sentencing Reform Act, see Bonnie R. Cohen, New York State Sentencing Reform
Act of 1995, N.Y. L.J., June 30, 1995, at 1. For a chart of current felony sentencing in New
York (including drug offenses), see Bonnie R. Cohen, New York State Felony Sentencing
Chart, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at 1; see also Human Rights Watch, Who Goes to Prison
for Drug Offenses?: A Rebuttal to the New York State District Attorneys Association, at
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/drugs/ny-drugs.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
30 See supra note 22.
31 See Raeder, supra note 19, at 929 (noting increased sentences and proportion of
sentence served in prison under Guidelines); cf. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 18, at 145-48
(discussing need for more choices for federal judges in sentencing offenders). The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a commission
formed by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Tonry, supra note 18, at 11.
In many instances, New York sentences are harsher than the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Huling, supra note 10, at 16 (stating that switch to prosecution under New
York state law could trigger harsher penalties than are available under federal law);
Shechtman, supra note 3, at 2 (comparing New York versus federal sentences and noting
lesser sentences under federal law). A full examination of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines is beyond the scope of this Note, but for an excellent critique of the federal scheme,
including an examination of its impact on women, see generally Raeder, supra note 19;
Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, Crim. Just., Fall 1993, at 20.
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B. Effects of the Rockefeller Drug Laws
In the past twenty-eight years, the Rockefeller Drug Laws have
had a significant impact on New York's prison population. 32 The
prison population today is over 70,000. 33 As of March 2000, 5%, or
3508, of these prisoners are women.34 Prior to the enactment of the
Laws in 1973, there were approximately 12,500 prisoners in New York
state prisons.35 At that time, there were 400 women prisoners, ap-
proximately 3.2% of the prison population.
3 6
While the number of women prisoners today may not seem signif-
icant compared to the prison population as a whole, it is startling to
examine the increase in the rate of incarceration, and the fact that the
large part of this increase is due to incarceration for drug offenses. In
New York, 156% more women received prison sentences in 1995 as
compared to 1986; men experienced only a 49% increase during this
time.3 7 Of this increase in women prisoners, 91% was due to the im-
position of prison sentences for drug offenses.3 s From 1986 to 1995,
32 Statistics are not available to evaluate trends over the complete time period from the
passage of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973 until today. Studies that gathered statistics
over portions of this time period will be presented in this Part. In general, upon examina-
tion of the various statistics, one finds that the dynamics that the particular statistics
demonstrate (e.g., growth of incarceration rate) remain constant since 1973. Cf. Alfred
Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, in Prisons 17, 19 flig.1
(Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilla eds., 1999) (showing steady increase in incarceration
rates for state and federal prisoners from mid-1970s to 1997).
33 Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Prisoner Profile (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York Univer-
sity Law Review).
34 Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5.
35 Women in Prison Project, Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Mandatory Injustice: Case Histories
of Women Convicted Under New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, at ii (Apr. 1999) (on file
with the New York University Law Review) [hereinafter Mandatory Injustice]. This signii-
cant rise in the prison population is mainly attributable to the severe sanctioning of drug
offenses, rather than a result of a significant rise in other types of crime (e.g., violent
crime). In 1980, only 11% of people sent to New York state prison were drug offenders; in
1999,44.5% of people sentenced that year were drug offenders. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Basic
Prison & Jail Fact Sheet (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
36 Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii.
37 Marc Mauer et al., The Sentencing Project, Gender and Justice: Women, Drugs, and
Sentencing Policy 9 (1999). The increase for women may be due in part to the presence of
more women who are repeat drug offenders and thus trigger the repeat offender portions
of the drug laws. Id. at 9-10; see also N.Y. Penal Law, § 70.06 (McKinney 1998) (Second
Felony Offender Law). Overall, the majority of drug offenders do not end up in prison.
Mauer et al., supra, at 11. Offenders are often encouraged to plea-bargain in order to
avoid the harsh sentences of imprisonment mandated in the more serious felonies. Id.
Then, if the woman commits a second drug offense (having received no drug treatment in
the interim), she is sentenced as a repeat felony offender, and receives a higher sentence,
due to her first guilty plea to a low-level felony. Id.
38 Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 3. The high increase in the rate of women sentenced
to prison is a consequence of both an increase in the number of arrests and an increase in
the likelihood of being sentenced to prison once arrested for a drug offense. See id. at 8.
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there was a 487% increase in incarceration commitments for female
drug offenders; for male drug offenders, this rise was 203%.39 Al-
though an increase in the women's prison population was expected to
some extent after the passage of the Laws, the rise has been so dra-
matic that it has caused even the Laws' supporters to question
whether such an increase was merited.40
The large increase in the rate of women's imprisonment invites
the question whether it is sound policy to mandate imprisonment for
certain drug crimes. More importantly, however, it also leads one to
ask whether the increase in women's imprisonment in particular is
correlated with the blameworthiness of women drug offenders and
what we believe is the appropriate punishment for their individual
crimes. If the crimes that women drug offenders commit are exactly
the same as those of male drug offenders, there is no justifiable reason
why we should be particularly concerned with the greater increase in
the rate of women's imprisonment.41 However, acceptance of the
large increase in women's incarceration is premised on the assump-
tions that the drug crimes women and men commit are the same, that
their characteristics as offenders are the same, and that therefore men
Although there are more men in prison than women, women in prison are more likely
than the men to be there because of a drug offense. Id. at 11. Overall, approximately
thirty-three percent (over 22,000) of prisoners in New York are drug offenders. Corr.
Ass'n of N.Y., Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Drug Offenders in New York State 1 (Mar.
1999) (on file with the New York University Law Review); Human Rights Watch, supra
note 29. In 1997, thirty-two percent of male prisoners in New York state prisons were
incarcerated for drug offenses. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 10. This figure was over
sixty percent for women. Id.; Johnson, supra note 16, at 44 & n.273 (citing data from New
York State Department of Correctional Services).
39 Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 9.
40 Cf. id. (stating that "[w]hile one would expect the number of women's drug convic-
tions to have risen along with the increase in arrests over this ten-year period, in fact
women's drug convictions rose at a substantially faster rate"); see also supra note 3 (dis-
cussing general opposition to Laws).
The increase in the number of women in prison for drug offenses makes startlingly
clear the disproportionate number of low-income women of color who are sentenced for
drug crimes in New York. In 2000, 91% of women in New York prisons for a drug offense
were women of color; 55% were African American and 36% were Latina. Corr. Ass'n of
N.Y., supra note 5. White, non-Latina women comprised only approximately 9% of fe-
male drug offenders, compared to 17% of the general female prison population. Id. This
significant increase in the percentage of African American women in prison in New York is
echoed nationwide: "Between 1986 and 1991, the number of African American women in
[all] state prisons for drug offenses increased by 828%." Keith Watters, Law Without Jus-
tice, Nat'l B. Ass'n Mag., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 1, 1. The majority of women in prison can be
classified as "low income." In New York prisons, 92% of women report incomes under
$10,000 prior to incarceration. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii.
41 A concern for women's imprisonment in particular is not mutually exclusive of the
general concern for whether imprisonment is an appropriate punishment for certain drug
crimes that both male and female offenders commit (e.g., minor possession crimes).
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and women should be treated the same by drug sentencing policies 4 2
The following Part argues that, as a matter of equity and fairness,
these assumptions should be questioned. In today's society, there are
legitimate differences in men's and women's drug crimes that should
be examined and taken into account in sentencing.
H
CRaIMN34AL Acrs AND THE CONTEXT OF A RELATIONSHIP
In determining whether a certain prison sentence is merited, it is
important first to examine the context of the offense. Only then is it
possible to ask whether this context alters the blameworthiness43 of
the offender, whether the current given sentence is a just punishment,
and whether this context should be taken into account in sentencing
42 Cf. Coombs, supra note 19, at 1689 (agreeing with Kathleen Dalys argument that
sometimes alleged gender-based "disparities" in sentencing reflect actual differences in
crimes committed); Kathleen Daly, Gender and Sentencing: What We Know and Don't
Know From Empirical Research, 8 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 163, 165 (1995) [hereinafter Daly,
Sentencing] (stating that difference in sentences for men and women can be explained in
part by assumption that "some features of men's and women's crimes and circumstances
may differ, which could be acknowledged in sentencing").
Certain characteristics of the offender, such as race and class, should never be consid-
ered when assessing blameworthiness. See Tonry, supra note 18, at 54 ("Every sentencing
commission has included reduction or elimination of racial and gender discrimination in
sentencing among its goals .... "); Alexander, supra note 15, at 200 (stating that sentencing
guidelines, mandatory minimum sentences, and repeat felon laws were enacted to provide
harsh, uniform, and fair punishment regardless of race or class). To the extent that such
biases are at work in the criminal justice system, these same factors influence the rates of
men's imprisonment as well as women's. Men of color, like women of color, are dispropor-
tionately represented in New York prisons. Approximately ninety-four percent of the drug
offenders in New York state prisons are African American or Latino. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y.,
Drop the Rock: Repeal the Rockefeller Drug Laws (Feb. 2001) (on file with the New York
University Law Review). In New York, an African American male between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine is twenty-three times more likely to be in prison than a white male
of the same age. Leven, supra note 4, at 645. Thirty-three percent of jail inmates in 1991
did not have jobs before entering jail and thirty-two percent of those who did work had
annual incomes of less than $5000. The Sentencing Project, Facts About Prisons and Pris-
oners, at http://%vvw.sentencingproject.orgfbriefibrief.htm (Mar. 1999).
Additionally, male offenders may share with women offenders a history of Aictimiza-
tion. Kathleen Daly, Gender, Crime and Punishment 83-86 (1994) [hereinafter Daly, Gen-
der]. While it seems as if more women than men have a history of extreme victimization,
this may be due in part to the reliance on self-reporting of victimization. Id. Men, due to
the ideals of "masculinity," may be less likely to admit to previous victimization. Id. at 85.
Additionally, common sites of male victimization, such as school and juvenile hall, may not
be incorporated into studies that focus on victimization solely in the home. Id.
43 This Note borrows the definition of "blameworthiness" from Kathleen Daly.
"Blameworthiness" refers to linking the offender's personal characteristics and history to
the offense. Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 168 n.18. This definition recognizes "how
a defendant's social history imposes meaning on a crime." Id. Thus, if the context of the
crime affects our notion of an offender's blameworthiness, then this context should be
taken into account in determining an appropriate sentence.
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reform.44 As this Part describes, the context of women's drug crimes
is often unique in that the commission of the crime is intertwined with
the woman's intimate relationship with a boyfriend or husband. This
Part highlights how this context, currently unrecognized by the Laws,
sheds light on the types of crimes for which women are convicted
under the Laws and the appropriateness of the resulting sentences.
A. The Context of a Relationship
Many women become involved in drug activities as a result of
being in a specific type of relationship; that is, being the girlfriend,
wife, or live-in partner of a man involved in drug activity.45 For many
44 Blameworthiness, along with the harm and consequences of the crime, is a tradi-
tional criterion that judges evaluate in determining an appropriate sentence. Daly, Gen-
der, supra note 42, at 37 (discussing views on blameworthiness and how judges assess it);
see also Coombs, supra note 19, at 1698 (agreeing that judges apply, or say that they apply,
notions of harm, blameworthiness, and consequences).
45 See Kathleen Daly, Women's Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of Law-
breaking and Problems of Representation, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 11, 14 (1992)
("A woman may continue lawbreaking as a result of relationships with men who may also
be involved in crime."); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a
Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of
Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 181, 214 (1994) (stating that many female drug offenders are involved in drug con-
spiracies due to their relationships with male codefendants); Raeder, supra note 31, at 21
("A number of sentenced women, particularly in drug conspiracy cases, are the wives or
girlfriends of male defendants who are the fathers of their children.").
This Note makes no claims regarding the actual numbers of women who become in-
volved in drug activities because of an intimate relationship. However, regardless of
whether this is the "main" reason that underlies women's drug crimes, it is a significant
enough aspect to warrant analysis. The factor arises frequently in studies of drug crimes.
See, e.g., Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 48 (studying felony women offenders in New
Haven, Connecticut, and identifying category of "[d]rug-connected" women as women
who "used or sold drugs in their relationships with boyfriends or family members");
Human Rights Watch, Official Data Reveal Most New York Drug Offenders are Nonvio-
lent, at http:l/www.hrw.orglhrw/press/1999/janny-drugOlO7.htm (Jan. 7, 1999) (reporting
that their research suggests that people incarcerated for drug offenses in New York include
"drug dealers' girlfriends and wives").
This is not to say that intimate relationships are the only reason why women become
involved in drug crime. Another reason is financial crisis and the need for fast money. See
Huling, supra note 10, at 59 (citing research in Great Britain demonstrating that most drug
couriers, many of whom are female, tend to be drawn into job due to one-time opportunity
to relieve economic pressures); see also Lisa Maher, Reconstructing the Female Criminal:
Women and Crack Cocaine, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 131,151 (1992) (highlight-
ing economics and gender as central influences in lives of women who are street-level crack
smokers).
For a general overview of women in prison and attempts to understand why women
commit crimes, see generally Clarice Feinman, Women in the Criminal Justice System 19-
87 (3d ed. 1994); Daly, Gender, supra note 42; Tracy Thornburg & Diane Trunk, A Collage
of Voices: A Dialogue With Women in Prison, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 155
(1992).
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women, the stories of their drug crime center on the fact that they are
intimately connected with men involved in drug crime.46 The
woman's drug crime is often in support of her partner's larger drug
activities.47
In analyzing the blameworthiness of some women drug offenders,
it thus becomes important to evaluate their drug crimes as crimes
committed, not simply by women, but by "women in relationship. '48
The term "women in relationship" has a significantly different mean-
ing than the standard phrasings, "women in a relationship with..." or
"women in relationships." The latter phrases imply that the relation-
ship is something separate from the woman and disconnected from
her actions and choices as an individual, while the former emphasizes
the relationship itself as influencing and shaping the personal choices
a woman makes. The relationship, and the choice to be in a relation-
ship, comprise a part of the woman's person. 49
A focus on the intimate relationship as an influence on women's
decisions gives value to the act of caring for another person and views
this motivation as one that may reduce criminal blameworthiness.50
46 See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 45, at 29 (presenting ex-offender's viewpoint that
many women become involved in criminal activities because of their relationships ith
men); Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35 (presenting stories of several women drug of-
fenders who were connected to male drug offenders); see also supra text aecompanying
note 45. The media empathetically has publicized this aspect of several women drug of-
fenders' stories. The story of Kemba Smith, a woman who became involved with drugs
through her boyfriend, was well publicized in general and black-focused media. See infra
note 85 (detailing Kemba Smith's case). Nicole Richardson's case is similar and also has
received a great deal of media attention. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text
(detailing Nicole Richardson's case). Some judges in drug cases have argued for leniency
based on the fact that the female defendant is involved with a boyfriend who is engaged in
drug activities. See, e.g., People v. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d 10S,114 (App. Div. 1997) (Ellerin,
J., dissenting) (stating that "the evidence supported no inference other than that, rather
than being a drug dealer herself, defendant was dating a drug dealer"); People v. Donovan,
454 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (App. Div. 1982) (Mollen, J., dissenting) (stating that defendant was
dating Mr. Kjellgren, person who originally was being investigated for drug activity and
who served as primary witness against defendant at trial).
47 For examples of such cases, see infra text accompanying notes 73-80, 86-92, 99-107.
48 This Note uses the phrase "women in relationship" to signify women who are in
intimate relationships with men involved in drug activity. Thus, although not stated explic-
itly in each instance, this phrase includes a woman who is married to, has a child with, lives
with, or simply dates a man involved in drug activity. While this Note focuses on hetero-
sexual relationships due to the similar focus of the available research, the context of a
relationship in a drug crime should be considered in same-sex relationships as well.
49 Cf. Robin West, Caring For Justice 5 (1997) (contrasting notion of self from
postmodern legal theory with notion of selfhood that "asserts either the moral importance
of the self's connections with others, or the seriousness of the harms those connections
sometimes occasion").
50 This viewpoint is rooted in what is often termed "an ethic of care." An ethic of care
is a vision of morality in which "moral judgment is oriented toward issues of responsibility
and care" rather than a morality that emphasizes justice through individual rights. Carol
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While it is true that the woman chooses to be in a particular relation-
ship, a focus on the context of the intimate relationship recognizes the
choice to maintain and support a relationship as one that has positive
value.51 Such a focus also recognizes the possible harms and negative
influences that are part of relationships as well.5 2 Allowing the con-
text of an intimate relationship to affect assessments of blameworthi-
ness reflects an understanding of both the positive and negative
influences that a relationship has on individual choice. It gives value
to the desire to maintain intimate relationships and at the same time
does not punish women further for potential harms already suffered
through "damaging relations of connection.
'53
Examining the context of an intimate relationship helps explain
the woman's decision to commit a drug crime.54 A woman may decide
Gilligan, In a Different Voice 98-99 (1982). Who demonstrates an ethic of care versus an
ethic of justice is not exclusively mapped onto gender lines. However, research suggests
that women's judgments are often linked with issues of care and maintaining relationships.
Id. at 69.
51 For example, if judges recognized, and valued, a woman's decision to maintain a
relationship (with a boyfriend who is a drug dealer), a woman's presence in her boyfriend's
home would not be viewed as a crime (as it is now due to the theory of constructive posses-
sion, see infra Part II.B.1) and instead would be viewed as a positive act to maintain a
relationship important to the woman. Mary Coombs argues that some women defendants
are disadvantaged by judicial assumptions that men are negative forces in women's lives.
For some women, connections to a husband, boyfriend, or other men provide a positive
force in the woman's life and may support her ability to be law abiding. Coombs, supra
note 19, at 1709.
52 Stephen Schulhofer critiques an "ethic of care" approach in part because in certain
contexts it can be dangerous to women to put emphasis on the continuity of relationships.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151,
2160 (1995). However, Robin West argues that adopting an "ethic of care" into our legal
system does not mean that the dangers to women in some relationships will be ignored.
Indeed, she suggests the opposite. West argues that the exclusion of women's voices from
legal and political history has resulted in the failure to recognize "either the moral central-
ity or the potential for harm that are inherent in our connected, relational lives." West,
supra note 49, at 7, 10 (arguing for legal and political theory to recognize both that "our
connections to others are... central to our moral sense and potentially harmful in ways ill-
heeded by the modem state"). Thus, to emphasize relations and connections to others
does not ignore the possible dangers; rather, it brings the potential benefits and harms to
the forefront of political and legal theory discussion.
53 West, supra note 49, at 7.
54 See Raeder, supra note 19, at 912, 977-78 (stating that fact that women offenders
often get into criminal trouble due to their associations with men should be more thor-
oughly examined and noting that many drug cases identify women by their relationships
with men).
Although beyond the scope of this Note, it is also important to question the structure
of the drug economy and the effect it has on the role of women in drug crime. Lisa Maher
suggests that the construction of work in the street-level drug economy is highly "raced"
and "gendered," thus keeping women in subordinated roles. Lisa Maher, Sexed Work:
Gender, Race, and Resistance in a Brooklyn Drug Market 107 (1997). According to
Maher, it would be a mistake to conclude that a woman forms or maintains a relationship
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to support her boyfriend's drug activities because she places the bene-
fits of maintaining the relationship over the risks she associates with
providing such help. The benefits of staying in the relationship may
include the positive aspects of an intimate relationship, such as com-
fort and companionship. However, the calculated benefits also may
include the risks of leaving. Many women may choose to become in-
volved in drug activities because the option to leave the relationship is
not a realistic one. Overwhelmingly, these relationships involve sub-
stance addiction and/or domestic violence.55 The need to continue a
drug habit5 6 or the fear of physical violence are very real reasons why
a girlfriend would choose not to leave her boyfriend and would choose
instead to commit a drug crime.5 Furthermore, if the boyfriend or
husband is the father of her child, a woman may prefer to keep the
family together rather than abandon the relationship.-S She might
agree to commit a drug crime or receive the benefits of tainted money
rather than endanger her child. Many women in relationship have
limited financial or familial support and therefore do not have the re-
alistic option of leaving the relationship in order to end any involve-
ment in the drug activity.5 9 More generally, research on female
criminality suggests that for women offenders the line between being
with a man involved in drug activities in order to gain the benefits of security or access into
a "higher," and perhaps more stable, echelon of the street drug economy. Id. at 104-07,
127-29.
55 Over seventy percent of women in New York state prisons report having had a sub-
stance abuse problem prior to entering prison. Women in Prison Project, Corr. Ass'n of
N.Y., Women Prisoners and Substance Abuse (Mar. 2000) (on file with the New York
University Law Review). In addition, eighty-five percent of women in New York state
prisons report that they have been physically abused at some point in their lives.
Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at ii; see also Daly, supra note 45, at 48 (finding in her
study that incarcerated women are often victimized as adults by violent men); Thornburg
& Trunk, supra note 45, at 163-64 (stating that most women prisoners in their study had
been abused by husbands, fathers, and other family members).
56 While male drug offenders may also have problems with substance abuse, given the
gendered structure of the drug economy, men are rarely dependent on women for their
drug supply. See Maher, supra note 54, at 107 (stating that high-level positions in drug
economy and those that generate income are male-dominated). Therefore, men are rarely
dependent on the relationship to continue the drug habit.
57 See infra Part Il.B for examples of the types of drug crimes that women in relation-
ship commit.
58 See Raeder, supra note 31, at 21 (arguing that many women "cannot remain crime
free unless they are willing to break up their families"). Seventy-five percent of women in
prison in New York are mothers. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5.
59 Raeder, supra note 31, at 60 (stating that dependent nature of women's relationships
with men involved in drug activities includes limited economic and family alternatives, thus
rendering it difficult for women to remove themselves from criminal activity).
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a victim and being an offender is often blurred.60 Women offenders
are often victims of crime at the same time that they choose to commit
a crime.61 Links between abuse and criminality exist in the lives of
many women offenders and complicate an understanding of why
women commit crime. The reasons why women commit drug crimes
become even further complicated when there is an intersection of vic-
timization and criminality within a woman's intimate relationship.
The search to understand the underlying reasons why women in
relationship may commit drug crimes is not intended to excuse
women's actions. The above reasons are presented not to suggest that
women should escape punishment for criminal acts or that women
cannot make their own choices, but rather to highlight the complexi-
ties involved in women's decisions to commit drug crimes, and, ulti-
mately, to argue that these complexities should affect their criminal
sentences. For many women, recognition of the context of the inti-
mate relationship is simply an acknowledgement that before the
woman commits the offense, she herself is a victim of a prior crime.62
In addition, it acknowledges the fact that discrimination based on gen-
der, race, and class also may restrict her choices.63 Recognizing that
there are societal influences on a woman's choice to commit a crime
does not take away her "free will." Instead, it is an acknowledgement
that, in many instances, her will is not completely free.64
60 Daly, supra note 45, at 47-48; see also Thornburg & Trunk, supra note 45, at 164
(stating their findings that women offenders are better characterized as victims
themselves).
61 See Coombs, supra note 19, at 1706 n.73 (citing studies that made connection be-
tween abuse and women's crime).
62 For example, domestic violence or physical abuse. See supra note 55 (presenting
statistics on rates of previous abuse of women offenders).
63 To recognize the constraints on women's will is to "contextualize their agency within
the terms of the . . . structures of patriarchy, racism and capitalism." Lisa Maher &
Richard Curtis, Women on the Edge of Crime, in Criminology at the Crossroads 110, 129
(Kathleen Daly & Lisa Maher eds., 1998).
64 As Lisa Maher states, "[d]efining social problems exclusively in terms of women's
individual choices allows scant acknowledgment of the differential social, economic, cul-
tural, and political realities that structure, and at times force, women's choices." Lisa
Maher, Criminalizing Pregnancy-The Downside of a Kinder, Gentler Nation?, Soc. Just.,
Fall 1990, at 111, 121. But cf. Leah Guggenheimer, Book Note, 17 Harv. Women's L.J. 237,
241 (1994) (reviewing Women Prisoners: A Forgotten Population (Beverly R. Fletcher et
al. eds., 1993)) (stating that authors of book harm women by suggesting that women are
dominated by men rather than being independent persons who make their own decisions).
This argument regarding the limits of women drug offenders' free will can be extended
to include most offenders, as most have had some restrictions on their choices earlier in life
(e.g., poverty, child abuse, racial discrimination). The argument relating to women offend-
ers is a subset of the broader argument and is used to evaluate the blameworthiness of drug
offenders who are women in relationship by highlighting their unique characteristics as
well as their shared characteristics with other offenders.
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Focusing on certain constraints of relationships and gender on in-
dividuals' choices may or may not affect an understanding of men's
choices in similar situations. While many studies have mentioned
women's connections with men as an underlying causal factor of their
criminal offenses, the converse may not hold true for the men in these
relationships. At least one study has found that male offenders gener-
ally are not connected to girlfriends or family members in selling or
using drugs.65 The context of the drug crimes of women in relation-
ship, therefore, may be different than that of crimes that the men in
the same relationships commit.66 Therefore, in sentencing, judges
should be free to acknowledge this significant and legitimate differ-
ence in the underlying context of men's and women's drug crimes.67
B. Criminal Acts Under the Rockefeller Drug Laws
Currently under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, the underlying inti-
mate relationship is not a factor that is taken into account in the
charging decision or the ultimate sentencing of the woman defendant.
The Laws forbid judges from considering any circumstances of the of-
fender or the crime.68 The primary types of criminal acts for which
65 Daly, Gender, supra note 42, at 78. Daly finds in her study of felony offenders in
New Haven, Connecticut that male drug offenders are less likely to work in concert with
others, whereas female drug offenders work more often with a spouse or intimate partner.
Id. at 154; see also Maher, supra note 54, at 106-07 (discussing gendered nature of drug
economy and men's monopolization of income-generating positions). But ef. Maher, supra
note 54, at 35 (discussing study in Brooklyn, New York, of female street drug users which
found that women street drug users had personal support networks which were women-
centered).
66 There may be other features of the context of men's and women's crimes that differ.
A study conducted by Kathleen Daly suggests that women offenders report higher rates of
abuse, less extensive criminal histories, and more child-care responsibilities. Daly, Gender,
supra note 42, at 84-85. However, questions to male offenders on these subjects may be
asked less often and men may be less willing to share such information. Id. at 85.
67 See Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 165 (arguing that some differences in men's
and women's crimes should be acknowledged in sentencing); supra text accompanying note
42.
68 This is a general problem that, in practice, hurts many offenders and not just women
in relationship. See infra Part III.A. However, it is still important to examine how women
in relationship are particularly disadvantaged when the context of their crime is ignored in
determining their crime and sentence.
Under the Laws, there is one opportunity for judges to take the context of the
woman's crime into consideration. Depending on the mitigating aspects of the crime,
women in relationship, along with all offenders, may be eligible for the "rare case excep-
tion." This exception is a limited opportunity for judges not to apply the mandatory sen-
tence and to exercise their judicial discretion in prescribing a reduced sentence. In People
v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1975), the New York Court of Appeals held that the laws
surrounding the imposition of the A-1 drug felony sentence were not unconstitutional on
their face. Id. at 341. The court, however, ended its opinion by stating that "[t]his is not to
say that in some rare case on its particular facts it may not be found that the statutes have
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women in relationship are convicted under the Laws can be catego-
rized as follows: (1) actions, or inactions, that become crimes based
on "constructive possession; '69 (2) actions that support criminal activ-
ity; and (3) low-level criminal acts.70 This section will examine these
three categories of convictions, highlighting the significant effects that
an intimate relationship may have on the woman's criminal behavior.
Such analysis provides a greater context for understanding these
women's criminal actions and evaluating the appropriateness of par-
ticular sentences for their crimes.
1. Crimes Based on "Constructive Possession"
The first category of acts under the Laws are crimes that require
no affirmative action on the part of the offender. Instead, the of-
fender is presumed to have committed a criminal offense because of
her physical position in the circumstances of the crime. Although the
offender may not actually have possessed a certain quantity of drugs,
the criminal act of another person's possession may be imputed onto
her through the legal theory of "constructive possession. ' '71 Once the
offender is presumed to have committed a criminal act, the underlying
circumstances are not taken into account, and the seriousness of the
offense is based solely on the amount of drugs involved.72
The case of Leah Bundy illustrates how inaction can satisfy the
theory of constructive possession.73 Leah Bundy was dating a drug
dealer.74 Although she was aware of his illegal activities, she denied
been unconstitutionally applied." Id. at 347. Scholars critique the exception as "meaning-
less" since it is rarely used by courts. Johnson, supra note 16, at 68. For a more detailed
critique of the "rare case exception" and a discussion of both successful and unsuccessful
uses of the exception, see id. at 68-71. See generally Kennard R. Strutin, Mandatory Mini-
mums, Life Sentences and the Eighth Amendment, 66 N.Y. St. B.J., Nov. 1994, at 6.
69 See infra note 71.
70 These categories are ordered according to the level of criminal action required by the
offender for conviction. The first category requires no action on the part of the offender;
action is attributed to the offender through a legal doctrine and the physical circumstances
of the offense. The last category requires a criminal act conducted by the offender herself.
These categories are not based on what level of drug crime the woman is charged with
under the Laws (e.g., A-1 felony, B, or C). Because the Laws base the level of crime on
the amount of drugs involved, see infra note 97, a crime which is in the first category may
be charged as a more "serious" crime and, as a result, have a longer prison sentence than a
crime in the third category. See infra note 95 (detailing percentage of women sentenced
for more serious drug offenses).
71 N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25(2) (McKinney 2000) (detailing statutory presumption of
constructive possession).
72 See infra note 97.
73 See People v. Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d 108 (App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 686 N.E.2d 496 (N.Y.
1997); Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7 (recounting story of Leah Bundy).
74 Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7.
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any involvement in her boyfriend's drug crimes.75 The night of her
arrest, the police mistakenly entered the apartment of Ms. Bundy's
boyfriend while responding to a call about a shooting in another
apartment.76 Hearing the police arrive at the apartment, the boy-
friend's brother, who was in the room with Ms. Bundy, threw the boy-
friend's crack vials out of the window. The police on the street
witnessed this action and subsequently searched the apartment, find-
ing two handguns and various drugs."7 Ms. Bundy was arrested and
charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance. 78 The
court stated that there was sufficient evidence to find that Ms. Bundy
"constructively possessed all the contraband in the apartment. ' 79 At
age twenty-one, Ms. Bundy was sentenced to fifteen years to life.80
Leah Bundy's case demonstrates how women may serve long
prison sentences based on acts they personally did not commit.8t
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.; Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
78 Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
79 Id. at ill.
80 Id. at 109. Christopher Clemente, the brother of Ms. Bundy's boyfriend, was sen-
tenced to fifteen years to life for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree along with a consecutive term of one to three years for weapon possession. People
v. Clemente, 609 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1994). It appears from the court's opinion that
Mr. Clemente may have had previous involvement in drug activities. See id. at 8 (permit-
ting prosecutor to impeach character witnesses by asking whether they heard about defen-
dant's prior acts of drug possession). Mr. Clemente was offered a plea bargain of a one- to
three-year sentence, but he refused. Mandatory Injustice, supra note 35, at 7. Because of
his refusal, Ms. Bundy was not offered the same plea bargain. Id. Ms. Bundy was granted
clemency in December 2000 by Governor Pataki. She had been in prison since 1991. John
Caher, Clemency Granted to Rockefeller Drug Inmates, N.Y. U., Dec. 26, 2000, at 1.
81 Several other cases illustrate the use of the constructive possession theory. In People
v. Ortiz, 564 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1991), Sol Ortiz was convicted of several drug felo-
nies and misdemeanors and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seven to fourteen
years. Id. at 428. Although Ms. Ortiz's boyfriend claimed that all the drugs and parapher-
nalia belonged to him, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to infer Ms.
Ortiz's knowledge and control of the drugs. Id.
In People v. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 1998), the court found the evidence
sufficient to establish defendant Brenda Prather's constructive possession of cocaine. Id. at
564. The cocaine was in a safe in her and her husband's home. Id. At trial, the prosecu-
tion impeached the defendant's husband when he testified that Ms. Prather was unaware of
his drug-related activities. Id. Ms. Prather was found guilty of criminal possession and of
aiding and abetting her husband's drug sales. Id.; see also infra Part U.12 (outlining facts
relating to aiding her husband's drug sales). The appellate court held that her consecutive
sentences resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life were "unduly harsh and
severe" and mandated that her sentences run concurrently instead. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d
at 564.
In People v. Gardner, 559 N.Y.S.2d 63 (App. Div. 1990), Sandra Gardner was arrested
while with her boyfriend in another person's apartment. Id. at 64. Ms. Gardner and her
boyfriend were allegedly at the apartment to deal drugs. Id. Ms. Gardner was arrested
after the police, though finding nothing on her person, found drugs in a duffel bag and a
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Women in relationship are at high risk of being charged with crimes
based on constructive possession because they are often present with
their boyfriend in his, or their, home. Though aimed at drug activities,
in such cases, the Laws punish the woman's mere presence around
drugs.82 Given that a relationship often explains the woman's pres-
ence, the Laws, in effect, punish the woman's decision to be in the
relationship.8 3 As the dissenting judge stated in Leah Bundy's case,
"the evidence supported no inference other than that, rather than be-
ing a drug dealer herself, defendant was dating a drug dealer. While
this may be an inadvisable personal choice, it is not, by itself, evidence
of participation in a crime." 84 By ignoring the context of an intimate
relationship, the Laws effectively criminalize the very status of being a
woman in relationship.
2. Actions that Support Criminal Activity
The second type of acts for which women are commonly impris-
oned under the Rockefeller Drug Laws are those that, although not
criminal in and of themselves, "become" criminal because they sup-
port ongoing criminal activity. Such actions include accompaniment
to a drug sale, answering the telephone in an apartment that is the site
of a drug sale, opening the door to such an apartment, or using money
that is the product of previous drug activity.85 These actions are likely
shaving kit close to where she was sitting. Id. The court remanded her case for a new trial
because the trial court failed to convey to the jury that the constructive possession pre-
sumption was a permissible presumption, but not one that the jury was required to apply.
Id.
82 The evidence that supported the government's case in Bundy also can be explained
as evidence of the existence of an intimate relationship. Evidence upon which the Court of
Appeals affirmed Ms. Bundy's conviction included her photograph in the apartment, which
"suggested a connection to this obvious drug factory," and the fact that she was allowed in
the apartment, because "a reasonable jury could conclude that only trusted members of the
operation would be permitted to enter." Bundy, 686 N.E.2d at 496. These two pieces of
evidence easily are viewed as evidence of being the girlfriend of the apartment's occupant
rather than being a member of the drug conspiracy.
83 See Raeder, supra note 31, at 60 (arguing that "[b]ecause of the ways in which
women have been socialized to further their relationships with men, a woman's mere pres-
ence in the home is easily seen as tantamount to membership in a conspiracy"); see also
Maher, supra note 45, at 150-51 (stating that labeling low-level crimes women commit as
"volitional lawbreaking" criminalizes what, in reality, are these women's survival
strategies).
84 Bundy, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
85 For example, in People v. Vanderpool, 629 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 1995), Teresa
Vanderpool appealed her conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
third degree. Id. at 308. Ms. Vanderpool was arrested when the police searched the car
she was driving, a car owned by her boyfriend and codefendant, Ronald Vincent. Id. The
search warrant for the car was based on a tip that stated that Mr. Vincent was a drug dealer
and Ms. Vanderpool was actively involved in the operation. Id. The arrest occurred when
Mr. Vincent was allegedly making a trip to purchase drugs and Ms. Vanderpool was accom-
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to be extremely common for women in relationship, given that many
women live with their boyfriends or have children with men involved
in drug activity.
The stories of Brenda Prather and Nicole Richardson demon-
strate how such acts, in the context of an intimate relationship that
involves drug activities, can lead to harsh sentences. Brenda Prather
was found guilty of criminal possession and criminal sale of a con-
trolled substance. 86 Ms. Prather argued that she simply handed her
husband a piece of tinfoil, believing it was for cooking.Y When she
went to hand her husband the foil, she saw another man in their home
holding what she guessed to be a block of cocaine.88 The court found
sufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Prather "intentionally aided
panying him. Id. at 308-09. Ms. Vanderpool appealed on the legality of the search warrant
but her sentence was affirmed by the court. Id. at 309-10.
Debbie Davis was arrested and convicted of criminal possession following a search of
her apartment that she shared with her boyfriend, Thomas Ruffo. People v. Davis, 537
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 1989). Ms. Davis was convicted upon a plea of guilty and
appealed the legality of the search warrant. Id. The search warrant was obtained on the
basis of a tip which stated that Mr. Ruffo was a supplier of drugs and likely had drugs at
the apartment where he lived. Id. at 94. The tip did not mention that Ms. Davis was
involved in the sale of drugs. Id. When Mr. Ruffo was arrested on drug charges, he told
the police his address where he lived with his girlfriend, Ms. Davis. Id. This statement
then led to her arrest. Id.
Cynthia Vitanza and her husband were indicted for the criminal sale of a controlled
substance. People v. Vitanza, 563 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 1990). Ms. Vitanza alleged she
was innocently at their home, the scene of the sale, and that she lacked intent for the
completion of the sale. Id. at 560. The court, however, found her actions of handing the
buyer a plastic bag to hold the cocaine as evidence that she provided "the medium for
packaging it." Id. Thus, in the court's view, she aided and abetted the criminal sale. Id.
Kemba Smith, sentenced under the Federal Guidelines, is another well-publicized ex-
ample of how an intimate relationship provides a greater understanding regarding a
woman's commission of low-level support acts. While a college student, Ms. Smith became
the girlfriend of a high-level drug dealer who proceeded to physically and emotionally
abuse her. Reginald Stuart, Justice Denied: Kemba's Nightmare Continues as Movement
to Reverse Mandatory Minimums Grows, Emerge, May 31, 1998, at 41, 41. Ms. Smith's
charges focused on her helping her boyfriend run a drug ring. Id. At the age of twenty-six,
she was convicted as part of a drug conspiracy, receiving a sentence of twenty-four-and-a-
half years in prison with no parole. Id. Ms. Smith received such a sentence despite prose-
cutors' statements that she did not use or sell drugs or benefit from her boyfriend's drug
operation. Id. Ms. Smith was pardoned by President Clinton in December 2000. Deb
Riechmann, Clinton Grants Pardons to 59 People, Associated Press, Dec. 23,2000, availa-
ble at 2000 WL 30836209.
86 People v. Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d 562,564 (App. Div. 1998); see also supra note 81 for
facts related to the possession charge.
87 See Alan Feuer, Proposal to Ease Drug Laws Means Hope to Some in Jail, N.Y.
Tunes, Jan. 19, 2001, at B3 (reporting Ms. Prather's statements that she was barbecuing
when her husband requested foil, and that he also cooked often).
88 See id. (reporting Ms. Prather's statement that she knew her husband was dealing
drugs but that she was not involved and did not approve).
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her husband with his sales of cocaine,"8 9 and sentenced her to twenty
years to life.90
Another woman, Nicole Richardson, was eighteen years old
when she told a government informant on the telephone where to find
her boyfriend so that the informant and he could complete a sale of
LSD.91 For this telephone call, she was convicted of conspiracy to dis-
tribute LSD and received a sentence of ten years in prison.92
Upon examining these types of support actions, it becomes clear
that for women in relationship with drug dealers, their criminal acts
and their relationships are intimately connected. For Ms. Prather,
handing her husband tinfoil from their kitchen was an act that also
was done during noncriminal activity in their daily life. Ignoring the
context of the relationship disregards the possibility that her intent in
providing tinfoil was to maintain the daily routine of their relation-
ship, rather than to assist in drug activities. Nonetheless, the Laws do
not distinguish between support acts of the relationship and support
acts for drug activities, and thus implicitly equate the two. For many
women, and perhaps for Ms. Richardson, the reasons why they decide
to facilitate their boyfriends' drug activities are the same reasons why
they stay in an unhealthy and unsafe relationship.93 By ignoring the
underlying context of the intimate relationship, actions such as living
together, driving together, and answering the telephone, become as
"serious" as actual drug transactions. Moreover, ignoring the context
of the relationship, together with the harsh punishment of low-level
support acts,94 predominantly harms women rather than men, as
women are more likely to play a low-level support role.95
89 Prather, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
90 Feuer, supra note 87, at B3.
91 David Dolinko, Ethical Problems of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Tikkun, Mar.-
Apr., 1998, at 27, 30; Gregg Easterbrook, Run-on Sentencing, New Republic, Apr. 26,
1999, at 57, 57. While Nicole Richardson was sentenced under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Guidelines are very similar to the Rockefeller Drug Laws in their treat-
ment of the charged criminal acts of women in relationship.
92 Dolinko, supra note 91, at 30. One article summed up her case by noting that "[a]
foolish 18-year-old named Nicole Richardson, whose boyfriend had been dealing drugs,
gets ten years for a telephone conversation in which she told a buyer where to find him."
Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 57.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
94 See supra text accompanying note 70 and infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text
for discussion of how low-level acts are punished harshly under the Laws.
95 Research suggests that women, in general, play "peripheral roles in male-dominated
drug selling networks." Maher, supra note 54, at 87, 106-07 (additionally noting that hier-
archy of labor within street drug market is based largely on gender).
Seventy percent of women prisoners in New York were convicted of nonviolent
crimes. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 5. Under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, in 1997,
women constituted only 8.3% of those convicted of the most serious (class A-i) drug felo-
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3. Low-Level Criminal Acts
The third category encompasses criminal acts committed by
women who for the most part have a nonexistent, or a nonviolent,
criminal history.96 This category includes acts such as the delivery of
an envelope containing drugs or the completion of a drug sale. The
"seriousness," or level of such a criminal offense under the Laws, is
determined by the amount of the drug involved; the offense with
which the woman is charged is linked neither to her state of mind nor
to the context of the crime. 97 A woman, therefore, will receive a sen-
tence based on the amount of drugs in the delivery or sale without
regard to her role in the larger drug activities or the motivations un-
derlying her offense.
98
The story of Dolores Donovan illustrates how an intimate rela-
tionship can be intertwined with this category of offense."' Ms.
Donovan was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in
the first degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the first and third degrees.100 Her crime involved obtaining four
ounces of cocaine to help her boyfriend complete a drug sale. 10 1 Ms.
Donovan was first seen entering the home of Mr. Kjellgren, her boy-
friend, a man who was the subject of an investigation by the Long
Island Drug Enforcement Task Force and who was known to be both
a frequent user and seller of many types of drugs.102 There was no
nies. N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., New York State Felony Drug Convictions
by Category and Class (Sept. 1998) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
Sixty percent of drug offenders in prison in 1998 were convicted of the three lowest-level
drug felonies (Class C, D, or E). Human Rights Watch, supra note 45 (based on data from
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services). Ninety-five percent of women
charged as drug couriers in New York had no previous criminal involvement. Corr. Ass'n
of N.Y., supra note 2, at 2.
96 See supra note 95.
97 A review of the various drug offenses in New York's penal law shons the absence of
provisions for considering state of mind or role in the offense. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law
§ 220.06 (McKinney 2000) (defining criminal possession of controlled substance in fifth
degree). The level of drug offense is determined solely by the weight of the drugs involved
in the offense. See New York Sentence Charts, Chart VII: Controlled Substances and
Marijuana Offenses (McKinney 2001) (listing drugs and amounts needed to constitute dif-
ferent offenses). While each offense requires "knowing" the amount of drugs in one's
possession, in 1995, the Legislature made knowledge of the quantity a strict liability ele-
ment. Tsimbinos, supra note 1, at 626; see also supra note 29.
98 Unlike under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, there is no adjustment under the
Laws for a minor role in the drug offense. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3B1.2 (West 1999) (describing minor role adjustment).
99 See People v. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Div. 1982), aff'd, 451 N.E.2d 492
(N.Y. 1983).
100 Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
101 Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 119 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
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reliable evidence, on the other hand, that Ms. Donovan had any previ-
ous involvement in drug activities. 10 3 As the New York Court of Ap-
peals noted in a later case, "[the] Defendant's involvement in the
transaction was in procuring the drugs, apparently without personal
profit, at her boyfriend's behest." 1°4 At trial, Mr. Kjellgren was the
primary witness against his girlfriend.105 In exchange for his coopera-
tion with the government, Mr. Kjellgren, the original focus of the in-
vestigation, received a sentence of lifetime probation.106 For her act,
Ms. Donovan was sentenced to two mandatory concurrent terms of
fifteen years to life.107
Ms. Donovan's story demonstrates how an intimate relationship
may underlie criminal acts such as a single sale of drugs or the delivery
of drugs to complete a sale.108 The woman commits the drug offense,
103 Id. at 122 (Mollen, J., dissenting). The only evidence that Ms. Donovan had experi-
ence in drug activities was uncorroborated and unsworn statements by her boyfriend, Mr.
Kjellgren. Id.
104 People v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1994) (discussing People v.
Donovan as presented in Justice Mollen's dissent).
105 Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 121-22 (Mollen, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the cooperation as-
pects of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
107 Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
108 Other cases that exemplify this category include People v. Tovar, 685 N.Y.S.2d 528
(App. Div. 1999), People v. Migliore, 540 N.Y.S.2d 442 (App. Div. 1989), and People v.
Robinson, 417 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App. Div. 1979).
Tina Tovar had been found guilty of two counts of the criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the third degree and one count of criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance in the third degree. Tovar, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 528. She received an aggregate sentence
of four to twelve years. Id. Ms. Tovar appealed her sentence as unduly harsh due to her
lack of criminal history, the small scale of the offense, and her remorse for the offense,
which "stemmed from her involvement with a drug-dealing boyfriend." Id.
In Migliore, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's discretionary sentencing
of Eucharista Migliore to four years to life and resentenced her to the mandatory fifteen
years to life. Migliore, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 443. Ms. Migliore was found guilty of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. Id. at 442. The court disagreed
with the sentencing court's finding that the "defendant played merely a passive role as a
courier for her husband." Id. at 443. The appellate court found the record to show that
she was an active participant in the drug sale, that she had committed perjury on the stand,
and that she had committed other crimes in the past. Id.
Mary Lee Robinson was convicted of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
second degree. Robinson, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Ms. Robinson was tried jointly with her
husband, who was convicted of the same offense. Id. at 89. The husband's counsel re-
ported that his client, Mr. Simmons, was threatened that if he did not cooperate, his wife
would also be indicted. The husband did not cooperate. His wife, Ms. Robinson, was
arrested approximately one month after her husband's arrest for the same incident. Id.
The trial court judge said with respect to Ms. Robinson, "I feel she became involved in this
case because of her husband, Mr. Simmons." Id. While her involvement in the sale was
unclear, it appears from the record that she transferred the package containing drugs from
her and her husband's home to the location of the eventual sale. Id. The trial court sen-
tenced her to six years to life. Id. at 90. However, the appellate court decided that this was
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not for her own financial profit, but rather as part of maintaining the
emotional relationship. While it is true that the act that the woman
commits is criminal, to focus solely on the act rather than the underly-
ing circumstances can exaggerate the role the woman has in her part-
ner's broader drug activity. As the dissenting judge in Ms. Donovan's
case stated: "The defendant's role... seems to have been peripheral,
since she simply made inquiries for her erstwhile boyfriend and acted
as a courier for him in his attempt to obtain drugs."10 9 Women sen-
tenced under the Laws, like Ms. Donovan, are typically low-level of-
fenders with no serious prior criminal history.110 Women in
relationship may be drawn to commit a single drug crime, not as part
of a larger drug crime network, but as part of a larger intimate rela-
tionship. While the woman's drug offense should not be completely
excused because of the underlying relationship, understanding the
criminal act and judging the woman's ultimate blameworthiness re-
quire an examination of the reasons why a woman would choose to
commit a crime rather than leave or end the relationship."'
C. Providing Material Assistance Under the Laws
Regardless of the crime with which an offender is charged, an
offender can seek a shorter sentence under the "material assistance"
provision of the Rockefeller Drug Laws.112 "Material assistance" de-
scribes the information a criminal defendant can offer the prosecutor
a "rare case exception as described in Broadie and reduced the sentence to one year to
life. Id.; see also supra note 68 (discussing rare case exception).
109 Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (Mollen, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant's sen-
tence violated Eighth Amendment); cf. Carmona v. Ward, 439 U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("However serious its narcotics problem, New
York cannot constitutionally treat those with peripheral involvement in drug trafficking as
if they were responsible for the problem in its entirety.").
110 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
111 See supra text accompanying notes 54-61. The probation report in Dolores
Donovan's case stated that "the instant offense is out of character with the defendant's
normal behavior." Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 122 (quoting report). Understanding the
context of the relationship underlying the offense may help explain such out-of-character
behavior.
112 N.Y. Penal Lav § 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998) (defining material assistance). Re-
search on the application of the material assistance provision of the Rockefeller Drug
Laws is scarce. Some researchers, most notably Myrna Raeder, have questioned and criti-
qued the parallel provision in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Raeder, supra note 19,
at 980-84. For an excellent documentary on some of the results of reliance on assistance to
the government, see generally Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999)
[hereinafter Snitch], transcript available at http.//%vw.pbs.orghvgbhfpagesJfrontlineashosl
snitch/etclscripLhtml.
Since there is little research on the New York provision, this Note will discuss it using
studies of the federal provision. Despite some differences in application (e.g., different
judges and prosecutors), the provisions are almost identical in text and structure. Compare
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in exchange for a reduction in his or her prison sentence. 113 The
stated purpose of the provision is to provide an incentive for low-level
drug offenders to give information about high-level drug offenders.
1 4
Under the Laws, the prosecutor decides if the information is of "real
importance"; 115 in practice, this usually means determining whether
the information will lead to the arrest of a person involved in drug
activities. 116 This is the only way a person charged with an A-1 felony
can receive a reduced sentence of as little as lifetime probation." 7
Since the material assistance provision is the sole means of re-
ceiving a reduced sentence under the Laws, whether women in rela-
tionship have the ability to qualify for such a departure is a very
important determination. There is little research on how women of-
fenders fare in obtaining a reduction due to material assistance. 18
Research on whether women or men receive quantitatively more
"substantial assistance" departures under the parallel provision in the
federal system is also unclear."19 The critical question, however, is not
who receives more departures, but the reasons for which these depar-
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 5K1.1, with N.Y. Penal Law
§ 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998).
113 In the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, this aid is labeled "substantial assistance."
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 5K1.1. The terms are interchange-
able for the purposes of this discussion.
114 People v. Lofton, 366 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (discussing objective
of New York Legislature in enacting material assistance statute).
115 Id. ("'Material' is defined as being of real importance or great significance and 'assis-
tance' is defined as help supplied or given."). The decision of whether the information
offered is sufficiently helpful lies in the hands of the prosecutor rather than the judge. Id.
at 776.
116 The relevant part of New York Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) reads:
The court... may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction
of a class A-II felony or a class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty
if the prosecutor either orally on the record or in a writing filed with the indict-
ment recommends that the court sentence such person to a period of probation
upon the ground that such person has or is providing material assistance in the
investigation, apprehension or prosecution of any person for a felony defined
in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or the conspiracy to commit any
such felony ....
N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) (McKinney 1998).
117 Huling, supra note 10, at 19.
118 In researching this Note, no studies or documentation were found on the application
of the material assistance provision of the New York law.
119 For example, Ilene Nagel and Barry Johnson report that the data of the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission indicates that female drug offenders are considerably more likely than
male drug offenders to receive substantial assistance departures. Nagel & Johnson, supra
note 45, at 217 (analyzing data from fiscal years 1991 and 1992). In contrast, Myrna
Raeder, looking at the same data, concludes that substantial assistance accounts for a
larger percentage of all departures given to men than given to women. Raeder, supra note
19, at 980 (analyzing data from fiscal years 1991 and 1992). As Raeder notes, the difficulty
in analyzing this data is the lack of information on the individual circumstances in each
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tures are given. Researchers agree that women offenders often lack
sufficient information to merit a departure based on substantial assis-
tance.120 Furthermore, research suggests that for women who do re-
ceive such departures, considerations other than the value of their
information may have been the prosecutors' or judges' motivation.
121
Women offenders, however, cannot rely consistently on prosecutors'
sympathy or other discretionary factors that may support a material
assistance motion, and subsequently, a lower sentence.12 It is there-
case and how the treatment of women and men who attempt to offer assistance may differ.
Id. at 981.
120 While Nagel and Johnson state that female drug offenders are more likely than males
to receive a departure due to substantial assistance, they still give credence to Raeder's
contention that women offenders often lack sufficient information to provide legally suffi-
dent assistance. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 45, at 218 & n.175 (stating this proposition
and citing to Raeder in corresponding footnote).
121 Id. at 218 (citing research of Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer). Factors such
as sympathy toward a woman offender or the belief that the mandatory sentence is too
harsh may influence the prosecutor's decision to make a motion and the judge's decision of
how great a reduction in sentence to grant. Id.; see also Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Prac-
tices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 501, 531 (1992) (sug-
gesting that under Federal Guidelines, substantial assistance departures may be awarded to
sympathetic defendants rather than defendants who provided substantial help to prosecu-
tors). While these discretionary factors apply to both male and female offenders, in prac-
tice they disproportionately may benefit women offenders. Nagel & Johnson, supra note
45, at 218 (stating that disproportionate share of substantial assistance departures given to
women defendants may reflect judges' and prosecutors' greater sympathy for female of-
fenders). Nagel and Johnson argue that their finding that women receive more substantial
departures than men is evidence of continuing special treatment for women, but Kathleen
Daly argues that such disparity can be seen as judges addressing, and attempting to rem-
edy, the fact that the guidelines have "not been fashioned with women or variations in
their lawbreaking in mind." Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166.
There are other considerations that apply to both male and female offenders that
might cause prosecutors to ask for a substantial assistance departure. E.g., Roberto Suro,
More Informers Buy a Break on U.S. Sentence Guidelines, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1997, at
Al (stating that whether defendant gets deduction may depend on how defendant per-
forms as government witness at trial).
122 Raeder describes the current use of the substantial assistance departure by stating
"the fortuity of the departure is evident." Raeder, supra note 19, at 983. Raeder goes on
to say, "[wv]e will never know whether the wife was really granted the departure as a way of
ensuring the husband's participation .... whether she had enough information to justify a
departure, or whether she simply appeared deserving enough to warrant a sentence below
the mandatory minimum." Id. Discretion also removes any checks on prosecutors' deci-
sions whether or not to award material assistance. See People v. Garcia, 558 N.Y.S.2d 63,
64 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(1)(b) "in no way commits the
prosecution to taking any action to facilitate or otherwise accept defendant's offer of assis-
tance"); see also Stuart, supra note 85, at 42 (discussing case of Kemba Smith and claim by
her lawyers from NAACP Legal Defense Fund that government reneged on promise to
make substantial assistance motion in federal court).
Although the sympathy of prosecutors and judges and their feelings about mandatory
sentencing laws may lead to a more appropriate sentence for a particular woman offender,
reliance on such feelings is not an appropriate policy solution. Mechanisms in the actual
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fore necessary to evaluate women offenders' ability to satisfy the legal
requirements of the provision.
Examination of the ability of women in relationship to offer suffi-
cient information under the Laws highlights the problematic aspects
of the material assistance provision.'23 It is likely that women, partic-
ularly women in relationship, will be unable to provide the requisite
assistance as stated by law.124 Because the amount of information re-
quired to obtain a reduction is both substantial and unclear, low-level
offenders often do not have enough information to turn in higher
players in the drug chain.12s Given the gender-based role patterns in
drug activities, 126 it is disproportionately women who will not be able
to offer sufficient information. 127 For a woman in relationship, her
sentencing process should be created for the fair and appropriate sentencing of offenders
statewide, rather than forcing offenders (those who happened to know sufficient informa-
tion to be considered for an assistance motion in the first place) to rely on the possibility of
sympathy. For a policy proposal regarding the material assistance provision, see infra Part
III.B.1.
Additionally, the fact that prosecutors or judges may grant an "unearned" material
assistance motion because of their belief that the sentence would otherwise be too harsh
speaks for the need to evaluate and reform both the material assistance provision in partic-
ular and drug penalties in general. See Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166 (arguing
that gender disparity in sentence deductions is due to legal officials redressing an unjust,
male-normed sentencing scheme and suggesting more general reform based on viewing
women as sentencing subjects).
123 Many of the reasons why a woman may not be able to offer legally sufficient material
assistance, such as threat of physical harm and lack of sufficient knowledge, also may apply
to male defendants. See, e.g., People v. Eason, 353 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 1976) (stating
that despite fact that defendant told prosecutor all he knew about local drug crime, prose-
cutor is not required to deem that sufficient material assistance); Juan Gonzalez, A Loving
Dad Dies in Prison, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 14, 1999, at 12 (reporting that offender Jose
Garcia did not take offer to provide substantial assistance to government as gang leaders
threatened to hurt his family if he testified against them). This Note does not argue that
these reasons are exclusive to female offenders. Rather, it highlights that these reasons
why offenders cannot offer sufficient material assistance are often present in the context of
women's drug crimes.
124 See supra note 95 (discussing women's low-level support role in drug crimes); see
also infra note 127 (examining women's common role as low-level offenders as related to
providing assistance).
125 Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 2, at 2 (stating that "[1]ess culpable persons generally
do not possess information that would be useful to prosecutors"). But cf. Linda D.
Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Substantial Assistance: An Empir-
ical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy and Practice 12, at http://
www.ussc.gov/pdf/5kreport.pdf (Jan. 1998) (stating that study results demonstrate that de-
fendants' positions in drug conspiracies do not correlate with likelihood of getting substan-
tial assistance motion).
126 See supra notes 54, 56, 95 (discussing women's general roles in drug activities).
127 Huling, supra note 10, at 19 (noting opinion of drug enforcement agents and prose-
cutors that women rarely can offer valuable assistance due to marginal roles); Raeder,
supra note 31, at 61 (stating that women's peripheral roles in drug activities place them "at
a disadvantage" in obtaining assistance departure because they often have little to offer
government); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family,
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partner more likely will be able to provide assistance to the govern-
ment as he likely will be more directly connected to the drug
activity.128
It is critical to realize that, in addition to not having sufficient
information, a woman in relationship may not offer material assis-
tance because to do so would require her to "snitch"' 29 on her boy-
friend or husband. This aspect of providing information to the
government is particularly problematic for women in relationship
given certain characteristics of relationships that involve drug activi-
ties. 130 There are many reasons why a woman may choose to place
greater value on the relationship rather than on her individual interest
in avoiding a lengthy prison sentence. The woman may depend in
part upon her partner for economic support for herself and/or their
children. Additionally, the choice to snitch may not be a realistic one
if she is in an abusive relationship or her partner threatens to harm
her if she contacts the authorities.13' Since many female offenders do
not have a supportive family environment, as evidenced by the high
rates of reported physical and sexual abuse,132 a woman offender may
rely on her partner to provide familial support and structure, some-
thing he could not do if he too were incarcerated. Finally, the tradi-
tional socialization of women impresses upon a woman the need to
"stand by her man."' 3 3 Images of women who are deemed "valuable"
and the Community, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L 169, 174 (1996) (stating that women's minor
roles in drug trade, dominance of men, and fear for their children make it unlikely that
women will receive assistance reduction).
128 See, e.g., infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (presenting story of Dolores
Donovan); see also supra note 127 (discussing disadvantage of women generally in ob-
taining assistance motions).
129 In mainstream culture, offering assistance to prosecutors often has negative connota-
tions. Most commonly referred to in prison culture as "snitching," providing material as-
sistance is also referred to in the mass media as when someone "turn[s] in a few friends,"
helps "rat out" others, or, in the case of a large-scale drug dealer who comes forward, a
"kingfish who turned state's evidence." Jakes & Caher, supra note 3, at Al.
130 See supra text accompanying note 55 (listing comfort and companionship as positive
reasons for maintaining relationship, and drug addiction and domestic abuse as negative
reasons for doing so).
131 Even if the woman is not actually threatened with physical harm by an abusive part-
ner, as a victim of possible emotional and mental abuse, she may not have the courage,
self-esteem, or outside support needed to give information about him to the government
and survive the possible consequences.
132 Forty-seven percent of the female state prison population have been victims of physi-
cal abuse, while thirty-nine percent report being victims of sexual abuse. Many have been
victims of both. Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 1; see also supra text accompanying note 55.
133 See, e.g., Tammy Wynette, Stand By Your Man, on Stand By Your Man (SonylEpic
1968) (imploring listeners to "[s]tand by your man I And tell the world you love him I Keep
giving all the love you can / Stand by your man"), available at http:flckcoun-
try.homestead.com/standbyman-ie4.html; see also Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence,
and the Reinvigoration of the Traditional Family, 73 Ind. IU. 517,521 (1998) (arguing that
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because they do not abandon their boyfriend during trouble continue
today to be a part of the mass-media culture. 34 Therefore, while a
woman in relationship personally may gain in one respect by provid-
ing assistance (a shorter prison sentence), such action may not only be
an option that is unrealistic and would cause the intimate relationship
to end, but also one which would lead her to lose value as a woman in
the eyes of society.
Given that a woman in relationship often does not have, or does
not want to give, sufficient information, her and her partner's sentenc-
ing often results in what is termed "inverted sentencing."1 35 "Inverted
sentencing" describes the following scenario: The more serious the
defendant's drug crimes, the more information he possibly has to offer
to the government, and thus he ends up with a lower sentence than
someone who is a lower-level offender. 136 This result directly contra-
women have been "subject to a variety of social norms that emphasize the centrality of
marriage to women's happiness and that characterize unmarried women in harsh and stig-
matizing terms"); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search
for Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2502 (1994) (stating that alimony laws are more willing to
reward women who have "attached themselves to men in very traditional ways" and are
"good wives"); cf. Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem," 13 Berkeley
Women's L.J. 117, 134 (1998) (arguing that Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 "posits marriage as both a moral and practical solution to
poverty").
134 The message that a man is a necessary component of a woman's life and that a
woman should do whatever it takes to keep him in her life is omnipresent in mass media.
See, e.g., Laura Doyle, The Surrendered Wife 19-20,23 (2001) (arguing that women should
surrender to their husbands for happier marriages); Tamala M. Edwards, I Surrender,
Dear, Time, Jan. 22, 2001, at 71 (reporting national popularity of Doyle's The Surrendered
Wife and book's presence on national book circuit and Amazon's Top Ten); Suzanne
Fields, Editorial, Hillary Clinton's Election A Rebuke to her Smarmy Husband, Grand
Rapids Press (Grand Rapids, MI), Nov. 12, 2000, at D3, 2000 WL 29128075 (calling Hillary
Clinton "the stand-by-her man candidate"); Ruth Mathewson, Star Attraction, Australa-
sian Business Intelligence: The Courier-Mail, June 23, 2000, 2000 WL 23431186 (listing
celebrity women, including Hillary Clinton, who stayed with their men despite embarrass-
ing events); Eve, Gotta Man, on Let There Be Eve: Ruff Ryders' First Lady (Interscope
Records 1999) (hit hip-hop song in which woman raps: "[c]arry stories that can hurt him,
still he only trustin' me / Secrets never leave my mouth, even if they torture me / Always
taught to hold the ground, that's why I'll always be his queen"), available at http://
www.eve-empire.com/03.html; French Kiss (20th Century Fox 1995) (film in which heroine
falls in love with criminal and forgives him for all his crimes).
135 Dolinko, supra note 91, at 30 (quoting federal appellate judge Frank Easterbrook's
mention of possibility of inverted sentencing). There are some troubling results of the use
of the assistance provision, in addition to inverted sentencing, which are beyond the scope
of this Note. Attention has been brought to a growing underground business of selling
useful information to criminal defendants. A criminal defendant can purchase information
from outside informers and then use that information to attempt to get a reduction in
sentence for substantial assistance. Suro, supra note 121, at Al (describing booming busi-
ness of trading information).
136 Stephanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of Women Offend-
ers, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 26 (1995) (stating that first-time offenders can receive
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dicts the stated purpose of the assistance provision: to find and punish
high-level offenders. 137 For this reason, inverted sentencing is troub-
ling enough when it occurs between any two offenders or between
people involved in the same incident. The most manifest injustices,
however, occur when it is the result within the context of an intimate
relationship.
In many cases, a woman in relationship is not able to provide
assistance to the government while her boyfriend or husband is able to
do so, thus resulting in inverted sentencing within the relationship.
13s
What is even more troubling, however, is that the assistance provided
by the male offender in these cases may include not only giving infor-
mation on his other drug contacts, but helping in the prosecution of
his wife or girlfriend as well. 39 Recall for example, the story of
Dolores Donovan. 14 Ms. Donovan, who had no knowledge about
drug dealing, was unable to provide sufficient material assistance and
received a sentence of two concurrent fifteen-years-to-life
sentences. 141 Her boyfriend, on the other hand, the original focus of
the law enforcement investigation, agreed to cooperate with the gov-
ernment in exchange for lifetime probation.142 His cooperation in-
cluded testifying against Ms. Donovan at trial.
143
An examination of the ability of women in relationship to receive
a material assistance departure brings to light its many troubling as-
pects. Women in relationship have a difficult time securing such a re-
duction due to their lack of sufficient information or because of the
longer sentences than "career criminals" as only these high-level drug traffickers can offer
sufficient assistance).
137 See supra text accompanying note 114.
138 The case of Nicole Richardson illustrates this problem. See supra notes 91-92. Ms.
Richardson and her boyfriend were convicted of conspiracy to distribute drugs. Dolinko,
supra note 91, at 30. Her boyfriend received a sentence of five years as he was able to
provide substantial assistance to the government. Id. Ms. Richardson, on the other hand,
was not able to give enough information and received a sentence of ten years. Id.
139 For example, Dorothy Gaines received a twenty-year sentence under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. She was involved with a man who used and sold drugs. In ex-
change for a reduced sentence, he implicated her in the crime. Snitch, supra note 112
(discussing story of Dorothy Gaines).
Such assistance by men is not helping put more serious drug offenders behind bars;,
their girlfriends are rarely high-level drug offenders. Rather, the men are simply helping to
secure another conviction and their own reduced sentence. See supra notes 95, 127; see
also infra Part HI.B.1 for proposal against "snitching down."
140 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
141 People v. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (App. Div. 1982) (Mollen, J., dissenting)
(noting that defendant stated she was unable to provide more cooperation as she had no
further knowledge about drug dealing).
142 Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting). Mr. Kjellgren was originally facing a fifteen-year
minimum sentence. Id. at 121-22 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 120 (Mollen, J., dissenting).
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risks involved in providing such information. Additionally, the prob-
lem of inverted sentencing, given the differences in men's and
women's ability to give information, becomes even more troubling
when the context of an intimate relationship is highlighted.
III
REFORM OF THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAWS
Examining the Laws' treatment of drug offenders from the per-
spective of women in relationship reveals that, in application, the
seemingly gender-neutral Rockefeller Drug Laws are not gender-neu-
tral at all. Instead, sentences under the Laws are particularly unjust
with respect to women in relationship and the crimes they commit.
This focus on women in relationship is critical in order to propose
reforms that will adequately and fairly address their lives and offenses.
Moreover, a focus on how women in relationship fare in sentencing
illuminates general problems in the Laws, the reform of which will
result in more just treatment of male and female offenders alike.
A. General Critique of the Laws and Current Efforts for Reform
After highlighting the crimes and sentences of women in relation-
ship, it is clear that the Laws do not allow judges to sentence offenders
according to their level of blameworthiness. The Laws currently for-
bid judges from taking into account either the characteristics of the
offender or the characteristics of the offense. 144 The lengthy
mandatory sentences, and the fact that the amount of the drug in-
volved is the only consideration used to determine the level of of-
fense, force judges to sentence offenders to harsh terms of
imprisonment that they personally might believe are not appropriate.
These problems in the Laws, brought into focus by analyzing the treat-
ment of women in relationship, apply to many other offenders as well.
All women offenders are hurt by the Laws' refusal to look at the un-
derlying gender roles in drug crimes.145 Low-level offenders, both
male and female, are harmed by the Laws' sole focus on the weight of
the drug and prohibition against looking at the offender's role in the
offense.146
Reforms that respond to these criticisms of the Laws ultimately
will help make the Laws more just for many offenders, both male and
144 See supra text accompanying note 97.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 95-98; cf. Raeder, supra note 19, at 990 (stating
that mandatory sentences and prosecutors' power to plea-bargain can often disadvantage
women because of their minor roles in drug conspiracies).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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female. But the focus on a particular impacted group-in this case,
women in relationship-is a critical component of evaluating and pro-
posing more general reforms. Without this focus on the particular
groups affected, there is no assurance that the proposed reforms actu-
ally will address the injustices towards the offenders who many reform
advocates believe are deserving of more just treatment. Indeed, some
current proposals for reform will not address adequately the concerns
raised by recognizing an intimate relationship as the context of many
women's drug crimes. 147
Today, there are calls for reform from people on all sides of the
debate.148 People with various political viewpoints have proposed leg-
islative reforms that range from relatively narrow and specific reforms
to proposals for complete repeal. 149 Proposals for reform have come
in great numbers, but reform has not been carried out as of early
2001.150 Although eventually blocked in the New York state legisla-
ture due to political disagreements, 15 ' Governor Pataki's proposals
147 See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing problems with Governor
Pataki's proposal).
148 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (presenting statements supporting reform
from various groups).
149 Governor Pataki (Republican) proposed one of the most publicized reform bills, S.B.
5877. Aspects of the bill included appellate review for some drug offenders and the elimi-
nation of parole for high-level drug offenders. S.B. 5877, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); John
McArdle & Marcia White, Senate Approves Rockefeller Drug Law Reforms, at http'//
www.senate.state.ny.us (Aug. 4, 1999) (describing Pataki's bill); see also infra notes 153-57.
Chief Judge Judith Kaye also authored a reform proposal that is similar to Governor
Pataki's. Her proposal allowed for some appellate review of serious drug felony convic-
tions and diversion of some low-level offenders into treatment. John Caher & Lara Jakes,
Reform Plans Push Chief Judge Into Debate, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 12, 1999,
at Al. Senator John DeFrancisco (Republican) has twice proposed a bill that doubles the
amount of drugs required before offenders could be sentenced for the most serious drug
felonies. S.B. 585, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 2992, 222d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999);
Yancey Roy, Drug-Law Reform Gains Steam, Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, N.Y.),
May 16, 1999, at lB. Former Republican State Senator John Dunne's proposal also called
for the doubling of the amount of drugs required for each level of drug offense, and al-
lowed for more judicial discretion in sentencing and the deferral of prison time for drug
treatment. Roy, supra, at 1B; Gary Spencer, Past Supporters Urge Drug Law Reform,
N.Y. LJ., May 13, 1999, at 1. Assemblyman Jeffrion Aubry (Democrat) proposed a bill
that called for the repeal of the mandatory sentencing requirements of the Laws and the
substitution of policies that allow more judicial discretion in sentencing. A.B. 4117, 222d
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999); Roy, supra, at lB.
150 Reform may have a better chance in 2001 than it had in earlier years. Governor
Pataki appears to have made reform one of his top priorities. See John Caher, Governor
Seeks Reform of Rockefeller Laws, N.Y. I.., Jan. 4,2001, at 1 (stating that lawmakers in
both parties agree that drug law reform is now top priority).
151 The bill was blocked in the Assembly by Democrat Assembly Speaker Sheldon
Silver. Lara Jakes, Vote on Drug Law Leads to Criticism, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.),
Aug. 5, 1999, at Al [hereinafter Jakes, Vote] (reporting Silver's refusal to allow Assembly
vote on Senate bill). Although Democrats in the Assembly stated they were in support of
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have had more political acceptance than most.152
An analysis of Governor Pataki's reform bill' 53 demonstrates
how, without a focus on women in relationship during the formulation
of the reforms, proposals may inadequately reform the current harsh-
ness in their sentencing. 154 For example, the Pataki bill offers appel-
late review of the sentences of the most serious drug offenders and the
possibility of a one-third reduction in their sentences. 155 In applica-
tion, this reform bill would not have a sizable impact upon women in
relationship because the vast majority of them are not convicted of the
most serious felonies. 156 Moreover, even for women who are eligible
for the reduction, an appeals court would be instructed, before grant-
ing such a reduction, to look at factors such as whether the offense
was an isolated incident versus a pattern of activity and whether the
defendant derived a benefit from the sale of drugs.157 In light of these
factors, women in relationship likely would not receive the reduction.
Because she may live with her partner and perhaps raise a child with
him, the woman's crime may be seen as part of the pattern of her
partner's drug activity, and acts such as buying food and clothing may
be viewed as receiving the benefits of drug money.
reform of the Laws, it appears that Silver did not want to back any reform package for fear
of Democrats appearing "soft on crime" in the November 2000 election. Lara Jakes, Silver
Softens Drug Law Stance, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), May 27, 1999, at Al [hereinafter
Jakes, Silver Softens]; see also Lara Jakes, Drug Law Debate Blocked, Times Union (Al-
bany, N.Y.), May 21, 1999, at Al (discussing Silver's blocking of reforms).
152 The New York Senate passed the bill, which was sponsored by Republican Senator
Dale Volker, on August 4, 1999. McArdle & White, supra note 149. The bill was passed in
the Republican-controlled Senate by a vote of 52-4. Jakes, Vote, supra note 151, at Al.
153 In January 2001, Governor Pataki announced new plans to reform the Rockefeller
Drug Laws. See Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Pataki Presents His Plan to Ease State Drug Laws,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2001, at Al. His publicized proposals include reducing the mandatory
sentence for A-1 felonies to ten years to life for first-time drug offenders and offering
judges some discretion to order treatment for repeat nonviolent drug offenders. See id.
While nonviolent drug offenders would receive some benefits under these proposals, any
drug offense during which the offender possessed a gun would now be treated as a violent
offense. See id. The analysis in this Part focuses on Governor Pataki's reform bill of 1999
as an example of how policy reforms often fail to address the concerns of women in rela-
tionship. This same analysis should be done with all future proposals.
154 Governor Pataki's bill will have some benefits for women in relationship. The bill
provides for the option of drug treatment for some repeat nonviolent offenders with sub-
stance abuse problems. Highlights of Sentencing Reform Act of 1999 [hereinafter High-
lights] (on file with the New York University Law Review).
155 Jakes, Silver Softens, supra note 151, at Al. A defendant convicted of the most
serious drug felony (Class A-i) can seek a reduction in sentence from a minimum of fifteen
years to a minimum of ten years. Highlights, supra note 154; Caher & Jakes, supra note
149, at Al.
156 In 1997, only 8.3% of those convicted of the most serious drug felony (A-I) were
women. Moreover, only 2.1% of women convicted for drug felonies were convicted of A-1
or A-2 felonies. N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., supra note 95.
157 Highlights, supra note 154.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 76:906
HeinOnline  -- 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 938 2001
June 2001] ROLE OF GENDER IN REFORMING DRUG LAWS 939
B. Proposals for Reform
By ignoring the characteristics of the offense and the offender,
the Laws have failed to address adequately the needs of many offend-
ers. This failure particularly harms women in relationship because
their crimes often have characteristics that affect their ultimate blame-
worthiness. Reform proposals formulated through the lens of women
in relationship can be viewed as taking a "woman-normed" approach
to sentencing.15 8 It is an approach that considers "women as sentenc-
ing subjects"'159 and uses the circumstances and experiences of
women's crimes as a basis for asking broader questions about fair and
appropriate sentencing for all offenders, men and women. 160 The fol-
lowing reform proposals are made in this vein.
161
1. Reforms of the Laws
The evaluation of the Laws' treatment of women in relationship
illuminates three substantial areas for statutory reform. First, the
level of offense should not be determined solely by the amount of the
drug involved.162 The use of amount as the only determining factor in
158 Coombs, supra note 19, at 1703-04 (using this phrase to describe her approach as
replacement for traditional male-focused and allegedly gender-neutral criminology).
159 Daly, Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166.
160 Id. at 167 (arguing for investigation of circumstances of women's lives and crimes
and using findings as starting point for discussion of broader questions about appropriate-
ness of men's and women's penalties); see also Coombs, supra note 19, at 1706 (arguing
that once certain factors that affect notions of blameworthiness in crime are observed in
women offenders, these factors should be taken into account in both women's and men's
lives).
The proposed policy changes are motivated in part by the need to point out the tradi-
tional centrality of the "male" perspective in the formation of policies and the lack of
incorporation of the realities of women's lives. However, as part of the awareness of the
exclusion of women's experiences from this "male" perspective, it is recognized that men
of color and low-income men are also not included in this traditional "male" perspective.
Therefore, while this Note focuses on a dialogue about women, this dialogue does not have
to exclude the experiences of men. Reforms in this vein "maintain[ ] a focus on women's
lives and on redressing harms to women, but ... do[ ] not ignore those men who have been
crippled by patriarchal, class, and race relations." Daly, supra note 20, at 15. Thus, by
suggesting policy reforms that focus on the realities of women offenders' ives, these poli-
cies also strive to address the similar needs of many margimalized men.
161 Reform proposals emerging from an analysis of women's drug crimes are arguably
gender-neutral, as opposed to gender-specific, thus achieving one of the goals of the Laws'
original sponsors. Kathleen Daly defines gender-neutral policies as those "that have con-
sidered the varied ways in which sex and gender matter in the social organization of crime,
in the particular contexts in which crimes emerge, in the seriousness of crime, in the culpa-
bility and blameworthiness of offenders, and in the consequences of punishment." Daly,
Sentencing, supra note 42, at 166. The proposals are not gender-specific because they can
be applied to both male and female offenders.
162 The amount (measured by weight) of the drug currently mandates the level of crime
committed and the corresponding sentence. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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the seriousness of the crime should be rejected because it ignores the
various roles offenders play in drug activities. 163 For women in rela-
tionship, it often overvalues her marginal role in the crime and ignores
her involvement in a relationship in which the man is the one signifi-
cantly involved in drug activities. 164
Second, the material assistance provision should be amended to
address the concerns raised by focusing on women in relationship.
For example, in order to fight the result of inverted sentencing,
"snitching down"'165 should not be allowed unless it could be shown
that the sentencing of the low-level offender is more critical to fighting
the drug trade than the sentencing of the high-level offender. In prac-
tice, this would mean that drug dealers who are the original focus of
police investigation would not be allowed to give information on low-
level drug offenders, such as their girlfriends or wives, in exchange for
a reduced sentence. It also would mean that the prosecution of the
low-level offender within a relationship, most often the woman, based
solely on the testimony of the higher-level offender in that relation-
ship, most often the man, would not be allowed.
Third, some judicial discretion should be reinserted into the sen-
tencing process. Judges must have the ability, other than relying on
the provision for material assistance, 166 to tailor sentences to the
blameworthiness of the offender. They should have a mechanism for
the consideration of both the characteristics of the offense and the
characteristics of the offender. A return to the pre-1973 setting of full
judicial discretion in the sentencing process is not likely, nor is it nec-
essarily desirable, given the importance of some uniformity in
sentences and the probability that racial and gender prejudices might
reemerge. Therefore, explicit mechanisms to harness judicial discre-
tion are necessary.
163 If quantity of drugs were determined to be an important factor in assessing blame-
worthiness, it would be possible to add consideration of the amount as an aggravating
factor to the sentence. This is the approach in California. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.73 (West
Supp. 2001) (stating that court should consider quantity of drugs in determining whether to
impose aggravated sentence).
164 See supra note 95 (discussing women's low-level roles in drug crimes).
165 This term is used to describe when an offender gives information on a lower-level
offender, thus snitching on someone lower on the drug chain.
166 While it is recognized that the government depends on the provision for material
assistance to provide needed sources of information, given that many offenders, particu-
larly women in relationship, cannot provide sufficient information, see supra Part II.C, it
should not be the sole mechanism for sentence reduction. Other means of reduction, such
as the mechanisms suggested in this Part, should also be available.
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One option is to create limited and narrow instances when a
judge can go below the mandatory sentence by a set amount. 67 To
address the concerns of women in relationship, a downward sentence
adjustment could be provided explicitly for cases in which it is proba-
ble that, but for the relationship, the offender would not have commit-
ted the crimes charged. Other possible adjustments, such as one for a
minor role in the offense, would benefit women in relationship as well
as other offenders judges may also find less blameworthy.
Another option for reform is to give the judge more discretion in
determining the sentence but to provide guidelines that list what fac-
tors are appropriate to evaluate, and what the corresponding
sentences should be. Voluntary guidelines could be adopted that sug-
gest factors, such as the influence of an intimate relationship, that
would justify a lower sentence.'68 Alternatively, specific lower sen-
tencing ranges could be provided for cases in which certain mitigating
factors, such as a minor role in the offense, are present. 169
The concerns of women in relationship would be addressed either
by a fixed sentence adjustment for certain cases where the drug crime
was tied to an intimate relationship, or by guidelines that instruct a
judge to consider this context in determining the sentence. In applica-
167 This option is exemplified by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. While this option
still does not allow a lot of judicial discretion, it would allow more tailoring of sentences
than currently allowed under the Laws. Under the Guidelines, there are explicit set sen-
tence adjustments for certain circumstances of the offense or offender (e.g., role in offense,
acceptance of responsibility). Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98,
§§ 3B1.2, 3E1.1. A larger departure is possible under the Guidelines but is rarely used by
judges. Judges are able to depart from the given sentencing range if they find circum-
stances in the case that make it unlike most other cases and render the defendant less
blameworthy. Id. at ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b) (stating guidelines for departures outside sentencing
range); see also, e.g., United States v. Milken, Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) I 96,933, 1992 %'L
196797, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1992) (No. SS 89 CR 41 (KMW)) (mere.) (granting reduc-
tion by taking into account substantial assistance by defendant, defendant's good acts in
prison, defendant's actions to work towards settlements of other related lawsuits, and ill-
ness in defendant's family). While this second type of adjustment is relatively rare, it is still
a means of rendering the sentence more appropriate. Currently, under the Rockefeller
Drug Laws, judges do not have the ability to reduce a sentence in either manner.
168 Delaware is one of several states that have a voluntary guidelines system. See Tonry,
supra note 18, at 27-28 (discussing sentencing system of Delaware). One caveat is that
some studies show that voluntary guidelines have little effect on the sentences imposed.
See id. at 27. Delaware may be the one exception. See id. at 27-28.
169 This mechanism currently is used in California. California has a determinate sen-
tencing system in which the judge has the option of sentencing an offender to one of three
sentence terms for the particular crime: the base term, the aggravated term, or the miti-
gated term. See Cal. Penal Code § 1170 (West Supp. 2001); Cal. Ct. R. 4A05 (derming
sentencing terms). Circumstances of aggravation and mitigation explicitly are listed. See
Cal. Ct. R. 4.421 (listing aggravating circumstances such as vulnerable victim and abuse of
position of trust); CaL Ct. R 4.423 (listing mitigating circumstances such as being induced
by others or playing passive or minor role).
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tion, these mechanisms would allow the judge to reduce the sentence
below the mandatory sentence if the judge determined that the rela-
tionship played a critical role in the offender's decision to commit a
drug crime, thereby reducing the blameworthiness of the offender. 170
Although it is difficult to define what circumstances will be sufficient
for this reduction, 171 judges traditionally have evaluated other diffi-
cult-to-determine sentencing criteria, such as the offender's accept-
ance of responsibility, the influence of others on the offender, and the
offender's family responsibilities.172 In evaluating the context of the
relationship, the judge's inquiry would include looking at the person
who was the initial focus of the investigation, the role the defendant
played in the actual offense, and the influence that the partner and the
relationship had on the defendant and her decision to commit the
crime. 173 It is therefore both possible and appropriate for judges to
consider the intimate relationship, either by explicit direction to eval-
uate the influence of the relationship on the offender, or within a
broader mandate to consider the offender's role in the offense.
2. Policy Reforms
If New York is serious about wanting to reduce both drug crime
and drug usage, the legislature must explore meaningful alternatives
to incarceration, including mandatory drug treatment. 174 Harsh pun-
170 A reduction in sentence would not be automatic simply because the offender was in
a relationship at the time of the offense. The judge would have to evaluate the circum-
stances of the crime and the individual offender to determine if the context of the relation-
ship affected the blameworthiness of the offender.
171 There is a risk that paternalistic attitudes will be inserted back into the sentencing
process. However, this risk is minimized by creating explicit instructions to look at the
effect of the relationship on the crime rather than allowing judges to sentence a woman
offender to a lower sentence simply because she is a woman. Additionally, instructions
that guide the judges' evaluation of the relationship, see infra note 173, help ensure that
judges will evaluate all offenders' crimes for the presence of such an influential relation-
ship rather than only some women offenders. See supra note 19 and accompanying text
(discussing paternalistic attitudes and favoring of white women).
172 Federal and state judges currently evaluate these various sentencing criteria. See,
e.g., Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, supra note 98, § 3E1.1 (allowing sentence ad-
justment for acceptance of responsibility); Cal. Ct. R. 4.423 (allowing sentence mitigation if
offender's participation was induced by others or was motivated by desire to provide ne-
cessities to family).
173 The offender should not be forced to testify in order to get information to the judge
about the relationship, as this would be in tension with her right against compelled self-
incrimination. Instead, the judge should look to the probation report, the factual record,
and the prosecution and defense witnesses as sources for determining the circumstances of
the offense and the influence of the relationship. For example, if the primary government
witness is the offender's partner, this would be an important clue that the intimate relation-
ship may have had a significant influence on the offender.
174 One option is to place more drug offenders in treatment programs as opposed to
prison. Studies have shown that drug treatment is more effective in reducing drug crime
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ishment of low-level offenders, particularly women in relationship, ig-
nores the complex social problems that impact the lives of these
offenders. 175 In fact, imprisoning the offender often compounds the
problems the offender faced before committing the offense because
the offender then becomes a victim of the prison system.176 To ad-
dress effectively the complex societal problem of drugs, we must at-
tempt to prevent drug crime before it starts. This entails constructing
meaningful ways for women to leave violent and unhealthy relation-
ships. Programs that help fight poverty and abuse and help women
achieve greater autonomy also would reduce the number of women
involved in drug crime. 1 " It also is critical that once women commit
an offense and are incarcerated, they, along with other offenders, have
options of drug treatment, educational programs, and counseling.
178
Such programs will support an independent and healthy life whether
in prison or out, and whether in a relationship or not.
CONCLUSION
These reform proposals are only the first steps in the reform of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws and other similar drug sentencing laws
across the country.179 While it is crucial that reform start immediately,
it is equally critical to begin the reform process by questioning and
and less costly than imprisonment. Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 42. In New York, Chief
Judge Judith Kaye has promised to expand drug treatment courts into every county.
Caher, supra note 10, at 1. In California, in November 2000, voters passed Proposition 36,
a reform bill that mandates that first- or second-time drug users who are arrested for pos-
session offenses are to be sent to drug treatment programs instead of being sent to prison.
Charles L. Lindner, The State: Is the Criminal Justice System Ready for Proposition 36?,
L.A. Tunes, Dec. 31, 2000, at M6.
175 See supra notes 54-61 (detailing low-level place of women in criminal drug hierarchy,
and frequency of abuse and addiction among incarcerated women).
176 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 29 (noting effects of imprisonment on offend-
ers' families, communities, and their own difficulties of reintegration upon release).
177 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 4, at 81 (listing several preventative programs such as
program preventing child abuse); Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., supra note 2, at 4 (proposing pro-
gram of "intensive supervision probation" that would entail job training, mandatory drug
treatment, and community service). Such programs should be available both before an
offender commits a crime and as an alternative to incarceration once a crime has been
committed.
178 See Currie, supra note 4, at 166-68 (discussing need, particularly for women drug
offenders, for drug treatment and community reintegration programs in prison); see also
Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent Women Offenders
and Their Children, 44 St. Louis U. I.. 377, 378-79 (2000) (urging funding of federal com-
munity incarceration program that would serve as incarceration location for women drug
offenders and their children and offer treatment and services).
179 See Tonry, supra note 18, at 30 tbl.2.1 (summarizing state sentencing guidelines sys-
tems); Mauer et al., supra note 37, at 6 (discussing study of New York's, California's, and
Minnesota's drug laws).
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examining the theoretical and practical foundations of this reform.
The Laws' failure to consider the social context of the offender's crime
particularly hurts women, as the context of drug crime is often gender-
linked,180 both in terms of the context itself (women committing drug
crimes within a relationship) and the position of women within that
context (women's support role in the drug activity and relationship).
Moreover, by ignoring the context of an intimate relationship, the
Laws also ignore problems within the relationship and the overlapping
societal subordination based on race, gender, and class.' 8' Recogni-
tion of these characteristics of the offender and the context of her
crime is important because it acknowledges both that many offenders
are subordinated and marginalized in society on the basis of race, gen-
der, and class, and that these same processes occur in the context of
drug crimes.182 Issues of violence, poverty, substance abuse, and dis-
crimination underlie and contribute to people's decisions to commit
drug crimes. By sentencing offenders without regard to these
problems, we end up "shaming and blaming those whose needs are
exposed."'18 3 This not only hurts the individual offenders, but also in-
jures society's own notions of equality and just punishment.
180 The term "gender-linked" is used to suggest that the various circumstances of an
offender's drug crime will differ depending on the gender of the offender. These differ-
ences are not innate to gender; rather, they are a product of the role gender plays in shap-
ing the circumstances and context of crime. See Coombs, supra note 19, at 1689
(supporting proposition that differences in men and women's crimes are not product of
gender as such, but rather are "gendered").
181 See Chesney-Lind, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that gender, race, and class of women
offenders often place them at periphery of socioeconomic society); see also Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1246 (1993) (stating that in context of battered
women of color, systems of race, gender, and class domination converge); supra note 40
(providing statistics regarding race and class of women offenders).
182 See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale
L.J. 1373, 1394-96 (1986) (arguing that law should focus not on gender differences but on
social and economic deprivation, which is promulgated based on these differences); see
also supra note 54.
183 James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic 237 (1996).
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